INTRODUCTION
Standing off as the repository being one among the rules in the interpretation of statutes, the ancient doctrine of Ejusdem Generis, known otherwise as ‘Lord Tenterdon’s rule’ or ‘Genus Species Rule of language construction’, roots in Latin, which meant “of the same kind and nature.” A facet of the principle “Noscitur a Sociis”, this secondary rule ensures no room for ambiguity. The main aim of the doctrine of statutory construction is to comprehend the legislative intent. When the need arises? To eliminate the ambiguity in the language of statutory provision, or when it defeats the purport of the statute, or when there exists two distinct views.
While looking into an example where the statute refers to cars, trucks, tractors, bikes, and “other motor-powered vehicles”[1]Can planes or ships fall within the ambit of the general expression “other motor-powered vehicles”? No, as the specified words preceding are land transports. By analysing the case laws where the doctrine can and cannot be applied, it helps to get an overview of the doctrine. There is the possibility of improper use of the rule that constitutes the limitation. Firstly, it is necessary to step into the meaning and essentials of the doctrine.
MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “the principle of Ejusdem Generis is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by particular and specific words. Not only are these general words are construed but also held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind as those specifically enumerated.”[2] When particular words which are having common features are preceded by general words that are elucidated in such a manner as to limit to include things specifically listed in the same class or genus.
To know how the doctrine works, in Evans vs Cross[3], “traffic signals” include “signals, warnings, and other devices”. The court held that a painted line on the road, not being of the same nature, shall not be included in “other devices .”[4] Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied to a different context or if general words derive it’s meaning from one single word which fails to form a class or genus.
ESSENTIALS- CANON OF INTERPRETATION
The five essentials of the doctrine as prescribed under “Amar Chandra Chakraborty vs. Collector of Excise[5] are:
- Statute contains an enumeration of specific words
- Subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category
- Class or category is not exhausted by enumeration
- General terms follow the enumeration
- There is no indication of a different legislative intent.”
Genus & Intention of Legislation
The doctrine can only be restricted to the same class when the enumeration forms a specific genus. For the interpretation, there should be a clear legislative intent or objective that should not be defeated by the identified class.
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE CONSTITUTION
- Article 12 [6]defines the term “ State” as including the expression “other authorities”. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot be applied here, as “other authorities” being heterogeneous are incapable of forming a distinct genus. [7]
- Further, it does not apply to Article 31 A(b)[8], the “ rights” and “other intermediaries” as the rights specified do not form the same genus.[9]
- The general expression “the making of contracts for any purpose” does not constitute the common class[10] mentioned in Article 298[11] , Right to carry on trade or business.
- ‘Other similar forms of forced labour’ in Article 23[12] , Prohibition of trafficking in human beings and forced labour. It also includes socio-economic compulsions, which is permanent in the concept .[13]
- The “weaker sections” under Article 46[14] require the state to promote educational and economic interests of the people and cannot be limited to Scheduled caste and Scheduled Tribes.[15]
- Article 226[16] empowers the High Court to issue “writs” for the enforcement of fundamental rights for “any other purpose”. This expression, instead of restricting power conferred to the High Court, has to be used even when a violation has not arisen, to be construed literally to self-imposed limitations.[17]
Case Laws (Applied)
Maharashtra University of Health & Ors. Vs. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & Ors.[18]
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in the application of Ejusdem Generis by removing unapproved teachers from the definition of teacher. The meaning of general words is fringed by restricted words. As a facet of “Noscitur a Sociis”, the associated words make up a statutory word. Further, the content of general words is derived from the context and cannot be read in isolation.[19]
Siddheshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India [20]
By applying the rule to limit the general word “any process” in the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944,[21] the word ‘manufacture’ includes specific words “bleaching, dyeing, printing, etc,” forming a specific class lasting in nature.
Case Laws (Inapplicable)
Lilavati Bai vs. State of Bombay [22]and State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan,[23] the two case laws where the rule of Ejusdem Generis was not applied where both dealt with the Bombay Land Requisition Act of 1948.[24] The interpretation by the Supreme Court in the former case that the words ‘or otherwise’ do not belong to any identifiable genus is consistent. The latter too depicts the requisition for a public purpose, the apex court overruled the High Court’s decision and held the words “any other public purpose”, confined also to the purpose of the state. Hence, no room for the application of the doctrine
LIMITATIONS
The application of the doctrine resulted in the existence of the essentials. So one can deduce that, on the contrary, that is in the absence of the conditions results in the inapplicability of the doctrine. The limitations herein:
- Vide the Department of Customs vs. Sharad Gandhi[25], the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the general words come in the first place, followed by specific words.
- One pivotal condition to confine the general word to the same class of specified words is an identified genus or class, and the absence of such a class confirms the limitation. There must be a category or genus constituted so that the general words concerning it can be restricted, as intended.[26]
- A single word cannot constitute a genus, and if the general word is followed by one word, the doctrine remains inapplicable unless that word is created by the court.
- As given in the “Principles of Statutory Interpretation”[27] , the general would depict a wider meaning if the specific words exhaust the class or genus. If, instead of giving mere specifications, results in a whole description renders the limitation of doctrine.
CONCLUSION
What leads to the improper use of the doctrine of Ejusdem Generis is that even though not fulfilling the essentials of the canon of interpretation, there are several instances where the court had admitted even when the specified words fail to form a distinct class or genus or contrary to the legislative intent, resulting diversion from the rule of law. This leads to a miscarriage of justice.
Hence, it is necessary to use the doctrine with great caution to be crystal clear in where and where not to apply. The purpose and objective of legislation are hence served by the guiding rule of statutory construction, the Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis.
Author(s) Name: Arunima Suresh (Govt. Law College Kozhikode, Kerala)
References:
[1] Vibhanshi Shakya, ‘All you need to know about the doctrine of ejusdem generis’(blog.ipleaders.in , Nov 4 2021)< https://blog.ipleaders.in/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-doctrine-of-ejusdem-generis/ > accessed 27 April 2025
[2] Bryan A. Garner , Black Law’s Dictionary ( 8th edn , South Asian House , 2015)
[3] Cross vs. Evans [1897] 167 U.S 60
[4] Cross vs. Evans [1897] 167 U.S 60
[5] Amar Chandra Chakraborty vs. Collector of Excise ( 1972 ) AIR 1863
[6] Constitution of India 1950 , art 12
[7] Housing Board of Haryana v. Haryana Housing Board & Employee’s Union (1996) 1 SCC 95
[8] Constitution of India 1950 , art 31 A cl.(b)
[9] Ananta Kumar Dutta v. Land Revenue Officer, (1958 ) AIR Cal 143
[10] Konadakandla Yadaiah v. State of Telangana, (2017) (2) ALT 161
[11] Constitution of India 1950 , art 298
[12] Constitution of India 1950 , art 23
[13] Rita Mishra v. Director, Primary Education, Bihar, (1988 ) AIR Pat. 26.
[14] Constitution of India 1950 , art 46
[15] Chairman, Adhoc Committee, Calcutta District Primary School Council v. Alpana Devi, (2003) SCC OnLine Cal 443
[16] Constitution of India 1950 , art 226
[17] State of Orissa v Madan Gopal Rungta (1952) AIR SC 12
[18] Maharashtra University of Health & Ors. Vs. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & Ors. (2010 ) AIR SC 1325
[19] Lilavati Bai vs. State of Bombay (1957) AIR 521
[20] Siddheshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India (1989) AIR 1019
[21] Central Excise & Salt Act , 1944
[22] Lilavati Bai vs. State of Bombay (1957) AIR 521
[23] State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (1955) AIR SC 810
[24] Bombay Land Requisition Act 1948 , s.6
[25] Department of Customs vs. Sharad Gandhi (2019) 4 SCR 273
[26] Jagdish Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. (1964 ) INSC 140
[27]Justice. G. P. Singh , Principles of Statutory Interpretation ( 14th edn, Lexis Nexis ,1897) 512
