INTRODUCTION
India’s rise as a global hub for garment exports is often celebrated as a success story of trade liberalisation and industrial growth. Fast-fashion brands sourcing from India benefit from low production costs, flexible manufacturing, and export-friendly policies. Yet, beneath this narrative of competitiveness lies a persistent pattern of labour exploitation within export-oriented garment units. Long working hours, suppressed wages, unsafe workplace and restrictions on collective bargaining remain recurring features of the industry.[1]
This paradox raises a critical legal question: how does trade law, designed to promote exports and economic growth, interact with labour protection frameworks? While India has made strides in consolidating labour laws and expanding social security schemes, empirical evidence indicates that enforcement remains uneven, particularly in sectors dominated by micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and informal subcontracting networks. Studies by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) highlight that a substantial proportion of India’s workforce operates within the informal economy, where labour regulations are weakly implemented, and oversight is limited.[2] Furthermore, research on Indian manufacturing demonstrates that increased subcontracting, driven by global competition, shifts production to less-regulated informal units, thereby complicating accountability and compliance. This article argues that India’s export-driven trade architecture, while economically effective, creates structural compliance gaps by prioritising competitiveness over enforceable labour rights. As a result, worker exploitation in fast fashion supply chains is not incidental but a predictable outcome of trade-oriented legal design.
THE TRADE ARCHITECTURE OF FAST FASHION
Fast fashion operates within a global trade regime that values speed, scale and cost minimisation. International trade agreements and domestic export policies focus on reducing tariffs, easing customs procedures, and encouraging foreign demand. Within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework, agreements such as the World Trade Organisation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 mandate tariff reduction and the elimination of quantitative restrictions under Articles II and XI, thereby facilitating market access for goods, including textiles and apparel. India’s engagement with such bilateral and multilateral trade frameworks reflects this orientation, with textiles and apparel positioned as key export sectors benefiting from liberalised trade regimes.[3]
However, trade law largely remains indifferent to production conditions. The World Trade Organisation framework excludes labour standards from its enforceable obligations, treating them as matters of domestic regulation rather than trade discipline.[4] The competitive dynamics of fast fashion also mean that firms are incentivised to cut costs at every stage. For example, international buyers often demand rapid design-to-delivery cycles, which put pressure on factories to extend working hours, hire temporary labor or subcontract to informal units. Domestic trade policies, while neutral in principle, inadvertently facilitate this by rewarding volume and speed without assessing the social costs embedded in supply chains.
Consequently, global buyers exert pressure on suppliers to meet tight delivery schedules and low-price points while legal responsibility for labour conditions remains fragmented across jurisdictions.
EXPORT INCENTIVES AND THE ABSENCE OF LABOR CONDITIONALITY
India’s export promotion regime relies heavily on fiscal incentives such as duty remission schemes and production-linked subsidies. Measures like the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) and its successors aim to neutralise domestic taxes and enhance price competitiveness.[5]
Notably, these schemes do not require exporters to demonstrate compliance with labour laws as a condition for availing benefits. This regulatory silence allows firms to externalise labour costs without risking export incentives. International labour standards, including core ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining, remain weakly integrated into trade policy.[6] There is limited government oversight ensuring that benefits are only given to compliant manufacturers, creating a moral hazard where exploiting workers is financially rewarded indirectly through tax breaks. Some global buyers attempt to enforce codes of conduct, but these are usually contractual and non-enforceable in Indian courts, leaving systemic gaps unaddressed. Furthermore, reports by NGOs suggest that even basic occupational safety measures, such as fire exits and ventilation, are frequently overlooked in factories supplying export-oriented fast fashion.[7]
COMPLIANCE GAP UNDER INDIAN LABOR LAW
India’s labour law framework, consolidated under four Labour Codes, formally provides protections relating to wages, occupational safety and social security.[8] However, enforcement within export-oriented garment clusters remains inconsistent. Subcontracting and informalization obscure employer responsibility, making inspections and accountability difficult.
While recent labour reforms emphasise ease of doing business and flexibility for employers, critics argue that higher thresholds for regulatory intervention dilute worker safeguards in practice.[9] In export zones, labour inspections are often irregular, and enforcement remains weak, particularly within subcontracted and informal units. Reports by labour rights organisations and empirical studies on India’s garment sector indicate that workers, many of whom are migrants or women, face significant barriers in accessing effective grievance redressal mechanisms. A study conducted in collaboration with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) across major garment clusters such as Bengaluru, Gurugram and Tiruppur found that workplace grievances, including wage disputes, sexual harassment and illegal termination, are frequently inadequately addressed within existing legal frameworks.
In addition to weak enforcement, there is also the problem of legal literacy among workers. Many garment workers, particularly women and migrants, are unaware of their entitlements under the law. Combined with language barriers, fear of retaliation, and insecure contracts, this limits their ability to claim legal remedies even when rights violations are blatant. The interplay of informal subcontracting, regulatory gaps and worker vulnerability creates a systemic environment conducive to exploitation.
WORKER EXPLOITATION AS A STRUCTURAL OUTCOME
Evidence from labour rights organisations suggests that exploitative practices in the garment sector are systemic rather than exceptional. Excessive overtime, delayed wages and unsafe working environments persist under the pressure of export deadlines.[10]
These conditions align with international indicators of forced labor highlighting how trade competitiveness can coexist with serious rights violations.[11] The legal framework’s failure to integrate labour accountability into trade policy allows these practices to endure.
Moreover, fast fashion’s business model prioritises rapid turnover, minimal inventory and low cost, often normalising labour violations as part of the production cycle. Exploitation is reinforced by social factors, such as the fact that women, constituting a significant portion of the workforce, are often poorly educated and have limited bargaining power. Workers’ inability to unionise further entrenches power imbalances.[12] This demonstrates that worker exploitation is not an incidental by-product but is structurally embedded within trade-driven fast fashion systems.
TRADE LAW AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF LABOR RIGHTS
The separation between trade law and labour rights is neither accidental nor neutral. Trade agreements often include labour provisions as non-binding commitments, lacking enforcement mechanisms comparable to those for tariff or intellectual property violations.[13] India has consistently resisted binding labour clauses in trade negotiations, citing concerns of sovereignty and developmental flexibility. For instance, during negotiations with the European Union for the proposed India–EU Free Trade Agreement, India opposed the inclusion of enforceable labour and sustainability standards, reflecting its broader stance against linking trade obligations with labour compliance.
However, in the Indian context, the absence of binding domestic enforcement mechanisms limits the effectiveness of such external pressures. Judicial observations in cases such as People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India underscore that non-compliance with labour standards, particularly in informal and contract-based employment, remains widespread despite existing legal protections.[14] Consequently, trade law continues to reward export performance while labour exploitation persists, highlighting a structural disconnect between market liberalisation and social justice obligations.
BRIDGING TRADE POLICY AND LABOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Addressing exploitation in fast fashion requires rethinking export governance. One possible reform is labour-linked conditionality, where access to export incentives is contingent on demonstrable compliance with labour standards. Comparative trade regimes show that such conditionality can coexist with competitiveness when implemented transparently.[15]
Strengthening labour inspections in export clusters, extending liability across subcontracting chains and ratifying key ILO conventions would further align trade growth with social justice. Civil society organisations and trade unions, particularly those representing informal women workers, play a crucial role in bridging enforcement gaps.[16] Capacity-building initiatives that educate workers on rights and legal remedies can enhance compliance from the bottom up.
CONCLUSION
India’s fast fashion export success reveals a deeper contradiction within trade law. By promoting competitiveness without embedding enforceable labour protections, export-oriented policies enable systemic worker exploitation. Trade law’s silence on labour accountability transforms rights violations into acceptable externalities of economic growth.
True competitiveness cannot rely solely on cost advantages or market share. It must incorporate ethical supply chain practices, enforceable worker protections and regulatory oversight, ensuring that export growth is not built on human suffering. Integrating labour rights into trade governance, combined with enhanced inspection, legal literacy and international collaboration, is critical to achieve sustainable, inclusive growth.
Author(s) Name: Riya Gugliya (Shri Vaishnav Vidyapeeth Vishwavidyalaya)
References:
[1] Fair Trade Advocacy Office and Change Alliance, Beneath the Seams: Strengthening Human Rights Due Diligence and its Impact on Textile Workers, Farmers and Communities in India (1 October 2025
[2] Institute for Human Development and International Labour Organisation, India Employment Report 2024: Youth Employment, Education and Skills (26 March 2024)
[3] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 187 (GATT), arts II and XI
[4] World Trade Organisation, Trade Policy Review: India (WTO Secretariat 2021)
[5] Ministry of Commerce (India), ‘Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS)’ (2015)
[6] International Labour Organisation, ‘Core Labour Standards and Trade Liberalisation’ (ILO Discussion Paper 2022)
[7] Fashion Revolution, The Garment Industry in India: A Paradox of Progress and Exploitation (18 April 2022).
[8] Code on Wages 2019; Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code 2020
[9] ‘Four Labour Codes Implemented in India in One of Biggest Workforce Reforms’ The Economic Times (21 November 2025)
[10] Amnesty International, Abuse of Labour Rights in Global Garment Supply Chains (27 November 2025 ).
[11] Somesh Jha, ‘World’s Largest Population: Will India Gain or Lose?’ Al Jazeera (18 April 2023)
[12] Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), Women Workers in the Informal Garment Economy (SEWA 2021)
[13] International Labour Organisation, Decent Work in Global Supply Chains (Report IV, ILO 2016)
[14] People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235
[15] United Nations Human Rights Office, Business and Human Rights in Supply Chains (UN Guiding Principles Commentary 2021).
[16] Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), Women Workers in the Informal Garment Economy (SEWA Jan2021)
