INTRODUCTION
One of the most intense legal inquiries of our era, in the unfolding saga of rights and justice, poses one of the most fundamental questions that subverts anthropocentric presumptions: “Do animals merit legal personhood?” Historically regarded as property in law, animals have long sat on the fringes of legal consideration. Yet, the development of international jurisprudence relating to animal rights has started eroding these hurdles. In India, this discussion gained unprecedented pace through the 2018 ruling in Narayan Dutt Bhardwaj v. Union of India[1] by the Uttarakhand High Court, which bestowed legal personhood upon all animals within the state.
The ruling is a drastic departure from jurisprudence, one that requires us not just to consider the place of animals in Indian law but also the more general ethical and legal considerations of acknowledging non-human entities as bearers of rights.
This blog critically examines the Narayan Dutt Bhardwaj verdict, places it against global trends, and questions whether the extension of legal personhood to animals is warranted or legally viable. In the process, it also examines the philosophical, doctrinal, and pragmatic arguments for and against the granting of legal personhood to animals.
LEGAL PERSONHOOD: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Legal personhood is a fictional concept of law that enables entities—natural (human beings) or juristic (corporations, trusts, rivers)—to possess rights and obligations. A “person” legally is not necessarily a human being. According to Salmond, “A legal person is any being or thing regarded by law as capable of rights and duties.”[2]
The Indian law system already has juristic persons in place. Temples, gods, and even rivers like the Ganga and Yamuna have been accorded legal personhood. The principle behind this is that personhood is a legal fiction that can be accorded by law for moral or functional purposes rather than based on sentience or consciousness.
The application of such status to animals, then, provokes fundamental questions: Can animals be bearers of rights? Do they qualify as legal persons? Or should they continue to remain recipients under welfare legislation and not right-holders in themselves?
The Case of Narayan Dutt Bhardwaj v. Union of India
In 2018, the Uttarakhand High Court in Narayan Dutt Bhardwaj v. Union of India gave a milestone verdict stating that the whole animal kingdom is a legal person and they have rights and obligations like human beings.
The case was with reference to complaints of ill-treatment of horses employed in pilgrimages. Although the specific issue was one of animal welfare and regulation, the court made a wider jurisprudential stride by invoking parens patriae and Article 21[3] of the Constitution—extending the right to life to include animals.
Major Court Observations:
- All animals are entitled to a right to life and bodily integrity under Article 21.
- Animals are “legal persons” with equivalent rights, obligations, and liabilities.
- The whole animal kingdom is proclaimed as a “legal entity possessing a distinct persona with equivalent rights, obligations and liabilities of a living person.”
- The State and the people are “in loco parentis” (in place of a parent) to animals.
Justice Rajiv Sharma, who wrote the judgment, drew heavily upon previous judgments such as Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja[4] and international animal law developments. He stressed the idea of “ecocentric” jurisprudence that acknowledges the inherent value of all forms of life.
Animal Welfare vs. Animal Rights
There exists a wide difference between animal welfare and animal rights. Welfare suggests humane treatment as part of human use—laws under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act[5] (PCA Act) function within this paradigm. It accommodates the instrumental use of animals, for instance, as food, for labour, and research, as long as it is minimised in cruelty.
Animal rights, however, advocate for the end of human exploitation of animals. This position, often based on moral philosophy (e.g., in Tom Regan[6] and Gary Francione’s[7] works), claims that animals are subjects-of-a-life and should never be regarded as mere means to human ends.
The Narayan Dutt Bhardwaj case occupies both spaces: though rooted in welfare interests, its finding of legal personhood implies a move toward a rights-oriented paradigm.
Comparative Jurisprudence: A Global Context
India is not unique in dealing with the issue of non-human legal personhood. Courts globally have grappled with similar issues. The Constitution of Ecuador in 2008 was the first to confer rights upon nature itself (Pachamama), enabling ecosystems to bring lawsuits in defence of themselves. In Sandra the Orangutan case[8] (2014), an Argentinian court declared an orangutan to be a non-human person, but one still with certain fundamental rights. The Supreme Court accorded rights to the Atrato River on the grounds of its spiritual and ecological significance to indigenous communities. The Whanganui River was declared to have legal personhood in 2017, mirroring the Maori perspective. The Nonhuman Rights Project (NHRP) has presented habeas corpus petitions for chimpanzees and elephants—mostly unsuccessful so far, but the movement has sparked legal and scholarly discussion. These instances are illustrative of legal personhood moving beyond the human, and India is leading the charge.
Constitutional Basis in India
The Indian Constitution, although only mute on animal rights as such, affords a rich basis for animal welfare in terms of Article 21[9] interpreted in Animal Welfare Board of India v A Nagaraja and Ors[10] to encompass animal dignity and protection from cruelty, Article 48[11] and 48A[12] to mandate the state to safeguard animal husbandry and the environment, Article 51A(g)[13], Constitutional obligation of citizens to exercise compassion towards living beings.
These provisions have enabled courts to evolve a liberal interpretation of animal protection. However, the transition from protection to personhood is a jurisprudential leap that pushes the limits of constitutional construction.
If corporations, idols, and rivers are legal persons, conscious animals—capable of experiencing pain and happiness—have a more compelling moral argument for rights. Personhood is a symbol of respect for entities as ends in themselves and not merely means. As legal persons, animals might possess legal standing in court, enforceable rights, and judicial remedies other than the constraints of welfare legislation. The State, being the guardian of those who are incapable of defending themselves, has an obligation to protect animal interests actively. The recognition of animals as legal persons affirms an ecocentric legal system that regards nature as a rights-holder, rather than a resource.
Criticisms and Legal Challenges
Legal personhood usually includes obligations as well as rights. Animals, being non-rational, cannot incur obligations or be made liable. If animals are legal persons, do ecosystems, bacteria, or AI come next? Where is the line drawn? Who will speak for animals in court? What relief is available? How will duties of care be enforced? Critics hold the view that bolstering the PCA Act and its enforcement is preferable to establishing elaborate legal fictions. Others worry about a weakening of human rights paradigms in situations of competition for resources (for example, wild animal habitats vs. tribal claims to land).
The Way Forward: A Middle Path?
Rather than full legal personhood, an alternative middle way might be the establishment of subjecthood or sentient rights for animals. This would grant them enforceable safeguards short of imposing cumbersome legal obligations.
India can also create Animal Public Trustees, like river trusteeships in New Zealand and Colombia, to hold the mandate of animal interests in law[14].
In addition, incorporation of the right to bodily liberty, protection from exploitation, and the right to ecological integrity in the PCA Act through amendment would be a practical legislative path towards realising the intent of the judgment. Legal training and judicial education on non-human jurisprudence are also necessary to build a solid framework that integrates constitutional values with ecological ethics.
Conclusion: Enlarging the Moral Imagination of Law
The legal personhood of animals is not a legal semantic nicety; it is a revolutionary enlargement of the moral imagination of law. The Narayan Dutt Bhardwaj judgment is a provocative move toward toppling the anthropocentric scaffolding of rights jurisprudence. But its success will depend on the ability to convert lofty utterances into enforceable realities.
Animal personhood asks us to force ourselves to answer tough questions: Are rights the exclusive province of humans? Can law systems be open to moral claims of non-humans? And most importantly, can we create a legal system that values life in all its forms—not because it is useful to us, but because it is?
The path forward may be complicated, but the path is clear. As climate change, ecological devastation, and biodiversity loss bring the planet to the brink, human existence itself could hinge on acknowledging the legal and moral claims of our fellow animals. Animal legal personhood is not a matter of sympathy—it could be a matter of justice in a shared world.
Author(s) Name: Ritisha Roychaudhuri (National Law University, Tripura)
References:
[1] Narayan Dutt Bhardwaj v Union of India WPPIL No 43 of 2014 (Uttarakhand HC)
[2] John W Salmond and Glanville L Williams, Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1966) 318
[3] Constitution of India 1950, art 21
[4] Animal Welfare Board of India v A Nagaraja (2014) 7 SCC 547
[5] The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960
[6] Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press 1983)
[7] Gary L Francione, Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (Columbia University Press 2008)
[8] AFADA v Government of the City of Buenos Aires (Sandra the Orangutan case) (2014) Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Tributario No 4, Expte A2174-2015-0
[9] Constitution of India 1950, art 21
[10] Animal Welfare Board of India v A Nagaraja and Ors (2014) 7 SCC 547 (SC)
[11] Constitution of India 1950, art 48
[12] Constitution of India 1950, art 48A
[13] Constitution of India 1950, art 51A(g)
[14] The Revelator, ‘Granting Legal Rights to Rivers: Is International Law Ready?’ (6 August 2018)
