INTRODUCTION
“The Governor, under the Constitution, has no functions which he can discharge by himself: no functions at all… the governor is bound to accept the advice of the Ministry.” This is the excerpt from the Constituent Assembly debate[1] In which Dr. Ambedkar highlighted the self-discretionary role of the governor of the state. Our Constitution mandates that the Governor of the State.[2] has executive powers of the state[3] and has the duty to “guide and counsel” the government[4]. The governor’s responsibilities include giving assent to bills passed by the State Legislature,[5] Which is essential for transforming a bill into an act; otherwise, the bill holds no executive value. But, if we analyse Article 200,[6] Which grants the governor three choices: either to assent, withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for the President[7]. However, instances arise where the governor remains silent or attempts to use a Pocket veto, despite lacking such authority in the Indian constitutional framework.
HISTORY OF THE GOVERNOR’S POST
The governor’s position has existed for a long time after the advent of the Britishers, but with the passing of the GOI Act 1935[8], under which the Governor was required to follow the advice of the ministers from the province’s legislature, while providing some unique responsibilities and discretionary authority[9].
Later, after Independence, the post of governor was retained, but the power under Section 75 of the 1935 Act, i.e., the expression “in his discretion” was removed.[10].
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION W.R.T THE RECENT COURT’S JUDGMENT
Recently, the apex court[11] Laid down several important guidelines concerning the “simpliciter withholding” of the bills passed by the legislature of the state. The court also interpreted the wording of the provisions, Articles 200 and 201. As per Article 200[12]When a bill is approved by the state’s legislature, it is sent to the governor, and the governor has three options, namely, approve the bill (assent), reject it by withholding assent, or send it to the President for further consideration. However, except for the money bill, the governor also has the option to return to the legislature with suggestions and ask them to reconsider. If the legislature passes it again (even without any change), the governor is bound to give his assent and can’t reject it.
Additionally, if the governor believes that the bill can significantly reduce the power of the HC, which threatens its constitutional roles, the governor is required to refer the bill to the president for a final decision.
The court made the following observations:
- Exercising the Pocket Veto is Unconstitutional
The phrase “shall declare” mandates the governor to provide assent, withhold, or reservation. The Governor’s refusal to provide assent without returning the bill for reconsideration (simpliciter withholding) violated the first proviso of Article 200.
As decided by the court in the State of Punjab v Principal Secretary[13] That if the Governor decides not to give assent to a bill, the first proviso of Article 200 applies, implying that he must return the bill for reconsideration with the message, i.e., the reason for returning or his contentions about the bill that needs a relook.
Further, the phrase “as soon as possible” in the first proviso imposes a duty of expediency. The Governor can’t act arbitrarily and unconstitutionally and delay the assent for a prolonged time. A similar emphasis had been made by the court in the Secretary to Her Excellency case.[14].
- Mandatory Assent for Repassed Bills
The court observed that under the first proviso of Article 200, it is required that the governor must give his assent when the bill is repassed by the state legislature, irrespective of whether the amendments he proposed were actually adhered to. The Governor “shall not withhold assent” to repassed bills, and any reservation by the Governor will be unconstitutional.
- Judicial Review of Governor’s Actions
While overruling the decision of the ‘B.K. Pavitra case’[15]As per incuriam, the court held that an arbitrary and mala fide act of the governor attracts judicial review. In constitutional law, arbitrariness is recognised as antithetical to equality.[16] Under Article 14.
- The governor is obligated to act on the Advice.
The Governor is required to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. [17]Under Article 200, as per Article 163, except in cases that expressly require discretion (e.g., second proviso of Article 163). The Governor’s unilateral actions in individual capacity, like withholding assent and reserving bills, even contrary to the Council’s advice, are violative of constitutional norms.
- Setting a time frame for taking action.
GOVERNOR’S ACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 200:
The court held that the governor has one month to withhold assent or reserve a bill when he acts in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers from the date the bill is presented.
The court provided three months from the date of presentation for withholding assent or reserving contrary to council advice, allowing time for consultation or legal opinion.
Further, the court held that one Month is provided for assenting to repassed Bills and the Governor must grant assent within that time period from the date of their re-presentation, unless the bill is materially altered to warrant reservation.
The rationale for setting these time frames derives from the Court’s interpretation of the constitutional requirement for expediency, as stemmed by the phrase “as soon as possible” in the first proviso of Article 200.
COURT’S OBSERVATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACTION
The court interpreted the provisions of Article 201 and set the timeframe for the President’s Actions, providing ‘three months from the date of reservation’ for taking a decision. It emphasised that he must either grant assent or withhold assent (providing reasons) on the reserved bills by the governor.
If the President delays beyond this period, reasons must be provided to justify the delay. If the bills were reserved on the grounds of unconstitutionality, the President should seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court under Article 143 within this timeframe.
Article 201[18] Reads, ‘when a Bill is reserved by a Governor… the President shall declare either that …’
In a manner akin to the governor, the President doesn’t have any ‘pocket veto’ or ‘absolute veto’ concerning executing his duties as stipulated in Article 201. The phrase “shall declare” creates an obligation for the President, suggesting that the President cannot choose to delay or indefinitely exercise a pocket veto. Consequently, he must choose between the two options, either to grant assent or withhold assent to a bill.
Further, the court held that the President’s actions are also reviewable, if found non-compliant with Article 201,[19], particularly if assent is withheld without any reasons or based on irrelevant grounds.
The court held that Article 142,[20] Grants the SC the authority to issue orders required for complete justice. This power was utilised in response to the Governor’s unconstitutional actions and extended delays, which compromised the integrity of the legislative process due to a lack of good faith.
SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT
This ruling significantly reshapes the constitutional landscape by limiting Governors’ unregulated power, strengthening federalism, and enhancing accountability. Its significance lies in eliminating unconstitutional practices like pocket vetoes and establishing enforceable timelines. The judgment by curbing Governors’ overreach ensures States’ legislative autonomy under the Concurrent List is respected. Dr. Ambedkar, under the Constituent Assembly debate[21], held that the “Governor should not have the power of interference in the province’s administration,…” and K.M. Munshi observed that the Governor must not act superior to the elected Premier. By prescribing timelines, the court prevents delays in bill assent, ensuring the timely implementation of laws addressing education, welfare, and governance. By expanding the umbrella of judicial review, the court can now keep a check on the Governors’ and President’s actions under Articles 200 and 201 against arbitrariness. The decision addresses the misuse of discretion and suggests constitutional amendments to limit their powers, ensuring they act as neutral facilitators rather than for political motives, which aligns with Dr. Ambedkar’s vision.
CONCLUSION
The recent Supreme Court’s ruling decisively curtails Governors’ arbitrary powers, prohibiting the use of pocket vetoes and simpliciter withholding of bills. However, some questions remain. First, if the president or governor is still delayed, then what options are available for the state government except seeking compliance through fresh litigation, which further takes a lot of time and clogs the court? Second, though the judgment presumes good-faith exercise of “aid and advice”, it doesn’t prescribe a sanction for bad-faith obstruction. Third, it will be needed to define the quantum of delay or what form of inaction actually constitutes “arbitrary” u/a 14. The judgment reinforces federalism by mandating strict timelines for bill assent and subjecting governors’ actions to judicial review. It also clarifies constitutional roles that align with Dr. Ambedkar’s vision of governors as neutral facilitators, not obstacles to governance.
Author(s) Name: Alok Singh (Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow)
References:
[1] Constituent Assembly Debates, 2 June 1949, vol 8, 293, available at <https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/02-jun-1949/> accessed 9 May 2025
[2] Constitution of India, art 153
[3] Constitution of India, art 154
[4] Sanskriti IAS, ‘The Constitutional Debates on the Role of the Governor’ (Sanskriti IAS, 9 May 2025) <https://www.sanskritiias.com/current-affairs/the-constitutional-debates-on-the-role-of-the-governor> accessed 9 May 2025
[5] Raj Bhavan Uttar Pradesh, ‘Powers & Functions of the Governor Under Constitution of India’ (Raj Bhavan Uttar Pradesh, n.d.) <https://upgovernor.gov.in/en/page/constitutional-role-of-the-governor> accessed 20 May 2025.
[6] Constitution of India, art 200
[7] V Venkatesan, ‘Does the Presidential reference raise questions which the Supreme Court did not answer earlier?’ (Supreme Court Observer, 19 May 2025) <https://www.scobserver.in/journal/does-the-president-reference-raise-questions-which-the-supreme-court-did-not-answer-earlier-tamil-nadu-governor/> accessed 20 May 2025
[8] Government of India Act 1935
[9] Centre for Law and Policy Research, ‘Government of India Act 1935’ (Constitution of India) <https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical-constitution/government-of-india-act-1935/> accessed 20 May 2025
[10] Naweed Akhter, ‘Hon’ble President Seeks Advisory Opinion Of Supreme Court’ (PMF IAS, 16 May 2025) <https://www.pmfias.com/president-advisory-opinion-supreme-court/> accessed 20 May 2025
[11] State of Tamil Nadu v The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr (2025) INSC 481
[12] Ibid at 6
[13] State of Punjab v Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab [2024] 1 SCC 384
[14] The State of Telangana v Secretary to Her Excellency the Hon’ble Governor for the State of Telangana & Anr [2024] 1 SCC 405
[15] B K Pavitra v Union of India [2019] 6 SCC 12
[16] E P Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu [1973] INSC 213
[17] Constitution of India, art 163
[18] Constitution of India, art 201, para 1
[19] Ibid at 17
[20] Constitution of India, art 142
[21] Constituent Assembly Debates, 31 May 1949, vol 7, 345 <https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/31-may-1949/> accessed 9 May 2025
