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With the decision of Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India[1], the Supreme Court has managed a final knockout to the individual underwriter’s right of subrogation emerging after the endorsement of the goal plan. The seat maintained the established legitimacy of the warning dated November 15, 2019, that brought into impact explicit arrangements of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) concerning individual underwriters of corporate borrowers. In doing as such, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the choice in SBI v. V. Ramakrishnan[2] to hold that endorsement of a goal plan considering Section 31 of the IBC doesn’t release the individual underwriter’s obligation since the equivalent was a direct result of a compulsory demonstration, i.e., by the activity of law, liquidation or indebtedness. Be that as it may, since the issue was restricted to the release of the responsibility, the Court didn’t straightforwardly investigate the underwriter’s subrogation rights emerging from Section 140 of the Indian Contract Act, 1972. In this article, the writer will intend to assess the situation with the subrogation privileges of the individual underwriter through the assistance of legal points of reference and offer a near viewpoint from the U.S Bankruptcy Code.


In Lalit Mishra and Others v. Sharon Bio Medicine Ltd.[3], NCLAT had completely held that “underwriters can’t practice the right of subrogation gave upon them in agreement law, since procedures under IBC are not recuperation procedures.” This was additionally affirmed by the Supreme Court on account of the Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel Ltd. V. Satish Kumar Gupta[4]. Albeit the IBC doesn’t altogether confine individual underwriters from summoning their right of subrogation, the individual underwriter is left with no cure once the goal plan is supported. This article sets down three circumstances where individual underwriters have the right of subrogation, each to changing degrees.

Right off the bat, when the individual underwriter releases its obligation towards the leaser before the commencement of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under Sections 7 and 9 of the IBC, in which case the underwriter is qualified for a venture into the shoes of the loan boss and recuperate the sum. Likewise, in the subsequent situation, when the bank recuperates the sum from the individual underwriter in the wake of starting CIRP yet before the endorsement of the goal plan, the right of subrogation keeps on excess with the individual underwriter. Nonetheless, in the last situation, when the mediating authority supports the goal plan under the IBC and the obligation is yet to be released, the individual underwriter’s right of subrogation quenches.

On account of Essar Steel Ltd.[5], the Supreme Court, depending on Section 31 of the IBC, saw that the objective of the goal cycle is to give the said candidate a new beginning, otherwise called the fresh start hypothesis. Giving the individual underwriter the right to subrogation would be contradictory to this standard of a new beginning, as when the goal plan is supported, subrogation will permit the underwriter to venture into the shoes of the bank and record his cases against the account holder as a lender himself. The fresh start hypothesis disallows such a chance as when the obligations are released, the loan bosses can’t bring further cases against the indebted person. It is likewise an impossible situation to step in as it will leave the indebted person back with obligations, vitiating the entire motivation behind the CIRP. The addition of Section 32A in the IBC[6] after the change in 2020 reemphasises the reason behind fencing the liabilities of the corporate account holder to what exactly has been now supported once in the goal plan, and in this way can’t be obligated for additional cases. zzBe that as it may, the Bankruptcy Code of the United States makes no such differentiation among pre-and post-endorsement of the goal plan, and which is all well and good. Such a qualification places the underwriters in a hopeless scenario. Neither the responsibility of the underwriter is released post-endorsement of the goal plan, nor does the option to recuperate the sum stay with the underwriter. In contrast to Indian law, the US Bankruptcy code[7] expressly accommodates the subrogation directly under Section 506 to Section 509. Further, on account of In re Sensor Systems, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court excused the reasoning behind such differentiation by seeing that, “The lone pragmatic contrast emerging from a full prepetition instalment,” the court noted, “is that the first gotten loan boss would presently don’t stay a leaser of the borrower at the hour of documenting.” Thus, the Court held, “Why this reality would or ought to be critical in deciding subrogation privileges of the co-obligor who makes the instalment is muddled to us”. Further, it was likewise explicitly expressed in Bugos, by the Court of Appeals that “the fair standard of subrogation applies as per the general inclination of obligations by a co-indebted person before insolvency just as to the post-request fulfilment of obligations.” Where the lone contrast between co-borrower and underwriter is that the co-debt holder is made at risk each time a case is raised, an underwriter is responsible when the debt holder defaults. There is no justification not expanding the guideline of subrogation rights to the instance of an individual underwriter where both the gatherings are at last releasing the liabilities of the corporate account holder.

Moreover, Section 509 of the US Bankruptcy Code, is genuinely mechanical in its application. The underwriter just needs to build up that it is obligated to the borrower on a case made against the indebted person by the loan boss, and the underwriter has taken care of that case. In contrast to the US, India doesn’t have a legal arrangement in the Code exclusively committed to the guideline of subrogation. Maybe, it is directed by Indian Contract Law. Segment 238 of the IBC makes unmistakably in instances of contention between two laws that are in power, the arrangements of the IBC would outweigh everything else. Nonetheless, this brings about many ill-defined situations which the court is yet to explain. On the off chance that the underwriter releases part of the obligation preceding the endorsement of the goal plan, can the bank reserve the privilege to conjure the assurance for the remainder of the obligation post-endorsement of the arrangement?

Albeit the Court in the Lalit Kumar Jain[8] judgment has dismissed the contention of the release of guarantee under Section 135 of the Indian Contract Act inferable from a synthesis between corporate debt holder and leaser, it disregards the impartial rule of subrogation. On whether or not the repayment of obligations in the goal plan between the corporate account holder and the leaser grants them to annihilate the privileges of the individual underwriter, an outsider who isn’t involved with the agreement, the Court should not fail to focus on the choice of the Supreme Court in Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair (D) by Los. v. Padmanabha Pillai (D) by Lrs.[9], here the Supreme Court saw that:

“A subrogation settles upon the teaching of value and the standards of normal equity and not on the privity of agreement. One of these standards is that an individual, paying cash which another is limited by law to pay, is qualified to be repaid by the other. This standard is established in Section 69 of the Contract Act, 1872. Another standard is found in value: ‘he who looks for value should do value’.”


It is reasonable why Indian Courts would hold the individual underwriters obligated without conceding him their right to subrogation, as it has been called attention to in the Lalit Mishra[10] case that the item is to resuscitate the organization and spotlight on amplification of worth of its resources, and not to guarantee that the credit is accessible to all partners. Nonetheless, while the privileges of the loan bosses are significant, they can’t come at the expense of the privileges of individual underwriters. The Courts wrongly accept that in by far most cases, the individual assurances are given by the chiefs, who regularly advance the worth of the organization out of close to home interest instead of in light of a legitimate concern for the organizations. Accordingly, any endeavour to stay away from their liabilities should be refuted.

In any case, dismissing the privileges of the individual underwriter will demotivate them to remain as underwriters later on. This will ultimately raise challenges for organizations to raise assets as it would discourage likely banks from loaning advances, and consequently, organizations will show more slow financial development with the lower capital infusion. It is irrefutably a fact that the development of organizations affects the economy of the country and the job of individual underwriters can’t be excused by setting the privileges of the loan bosses on a higher platform.

Author(s) Name: Syed Moosvi Raza Kazmi (Amity University, Lucknow)


[1] Civil No. 245/2020.

[2] Civil Appeal No. 3595 of 2018.

[3] Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 164 of 2018.

[4] Civil Appeal No. 8766-67 of 2019.

[5] Civil Appeal No. 8766-67 of 2019, Para. 49.



[8] Civil No. 245/2020.

[9] Appeal (civil) 13133 of 1996.

[10] Ibid.

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