The modern digital world has created new ways for people to manage their online reputation because it stores their personal information indefinitely. The Right to be Forgotten (RTBF) functions as a unique privacy law which permits individuals to request deletion of their personal information from online sites when that information contains errors or is no longer current or unjustly harmful to their reputation. The constitutional protection of Freedom of Speech and Expression functions as an essential safeguard for democratic accountability, public discourse, and transparency. The Indian legal system needs to conduct complex constitutional studies because it has two competing legal systems which require protection but The Right to be Forgotten remains judicially defined yet lacks any official legal framework.
Conceptual Foundations of the Right to be Forgotten
The RTBF traces its official acknowledgment back to European legal decisions which particularly apply to European Union data protection regulations. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its 2014 judgment in Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos which established that people possess a restricted right to demand the removal of search engine results that display outdated personal data because the information no longer needed processing for its original collection objectives[1]. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) established Article 17 as an official framework which created the “Right to Erasure” right.
The RTBF exists in India as a right to information that protects privacy rights which are established in Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court declared privacy to be a fundamental right through its decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v Union of India[2]. The judgment did not create an official Right to Financial Burden Test but used European legal decisions to support its conclusion that privacy rights exist in both active and passive forms which created a basis for judicial development.
Freedom of Speech as a Countervailing Constitutional Value
The Constitution of India grants every citizen the right to express themselves freely and share information with others according to Article 19(1)(a). The freedom enables citizens to participate in democratic processes while holding their government accountable through a system that establishes a public sphere for exchanging different viewpoints. The Supreme Court decision in Shreya Singhal v Union of India which invalidated Section 66A of the IT Act because it created vague restrictions on free speech shows how courts handle cases that involve unconstitutional speech limitations.[3]
The right exists as a fundamental human freedom, but it does not function as an unrestricted entitlement. Article 19(2) allows authorities to impose reasonable limits that protect against defamation and maintain public order and safeguard moral standards and other constitutional rights. The question of doctrinal existence arises because it needs to be determined whether a person can use their right to erase personal data through their constitutional privacy rights.
Indian Judicial Engagement with the Right to be Forgotten
In a number of disjointed but illuminating rulings, Indian courts have addressed RTBF, frequently in relation to victims of prior offences, marital conflicts, or acquittals.
1. In Sri Vasunathan v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, the High Court acknowledges RTBF’s emergence under privacy jurisprudence and permits the redaction of the petitioner’s daughter’s name from internet records[4].
2. In Zulfiqar Ahmed Khan v. Quintillion Business Media Pvt Ltd, the Delhi High Court recognised RTBF and awarded temporary protection against the republication of allegedly defamatory content as part of informational privacy.[5]
3. In Jorawar Singh Mundy v. Union of India, the Delhi High Court ordered a foreign website to delete the petitioner’s case file pertaining to an acquittal in a drug case, citing the negative effects on employability and reputation.[6]
- The Supreme Court upheld criminal defamation as a constitutionally permissible restriction under Article 19(2) in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, thereby reinforcing reputational protection as a legitimate state objective.[7]
- In K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, the Court reaffirmed that privacy includes control over the dissemination of personal data while addressing data protection concerns.[8]
- The Allahabad High Court allowed identity concealing in marriage disputes because of ongoing reputational injury in Suresh Chandra Sharma v. State of UP.[9]
Despite the lack of a formalised normative framework, these judgements collectively demonstrate Indian courts’ readiness to strike a compromise between informational sovereignty and public interest considerations.
Comparative Jurisprudence and Balancing Standards
Each jurisdiction has a different approach to striking a balance between RTBF and free expression: As demonstrated in Google Spain and later in Google LLC v. CNIL (2019), the CJEU uses a proportionality test, taking into account relevance, accuracy, time elapsed, and public interest in disclosure.[10] In Delfi AS v. Estonia, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) maintained intermediary liability for damaging remarks, indicating a readiness to enforce obligations of removal where speech infringes on privacy rights.[11]
In contrast, the United States has a speechcentric legal system that upholds robust First Amendment protections and has not recognized a comparable RTBF. India’s stance is still in the middle; free expression has a high normative value, especially when it comes to transparency and legal proceedings, but informational privacy is protected by the constitution.
Contextual Limits: Public Records, Court Proceedings, and Public Interest
Judicial records are one of the most delicate areas for RTBF claims. Open justice has always guided court operations, allowing for public inspection as a democratic check. In Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India[12], the Supreme Court upheld the importance of live broadcasting for public access, subject to appropriate limitations.However, anonymity may be warranted in cases when people are found not guilty or when the proceedings include sexual offences. Legislatively mandated privacy interests are reflected in Section 228A IPC, which makes it illegal to reveal the identities of rape victims.
Similar to this, the Supreme Court acknowledged the significance of victim dignity in sexual assault proceedings in State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh.[13] René These acknowledgements place RTBF in the context of more comprehensive dignitarian protections.
However, claims seeking erasure of information of historical significance, political accountability, or corruption investigations are unlikely to succeed due to overriding public interest. Thus, RTBF remains a qualified right, not an absolute prerogative.
Legislative Prospects and Data Protection Framework in India
Clause 20 of the now-retracted Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, called for an explicit RTBF that would be decided by a Data Protection Authority. The explicit formal definition of RTBF in India is still aspirational, notwithstanding the framework’s subsequent evolution into the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. However, the post-Puttaswamy constitutional acknowledgement of privacy guarantees that courts have doctrinal tools to assess claims.
Conclusion
A conflict between informational liberty and autonomy is revealed by the normative contradiction between RTBF and free speech. The prevailing free speech system protects democratic openness and public discourse while the RTBF promotes individual dignity, reputation, and data ownership. Influenced by constitutional proportionality and comparative reasoning, Indian jurisprudence promotes contextual balance through public interest, accuracy, and temporal relevance standards while increasingly recognising RTBF as a privacy-based entitlement.
RTBF codification would improve procedural uniformity and conceptual clarity within India’s data governance system. Until then, the major method for balancing the conflicting demands of expression and privacy is judicial balance.
Author(s) Name: Nikita (Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi)
References:
[1] Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (2014) Case C-131/12, CJEU
[2] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
[3] Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1
[4] Sri Vasunathan v Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, WP No. 62038/2016 (Karnataka HC, 23 Dec 2016).
[5] Zulfiqar Ahmed Khan v Quintillion Business Media Pvt Ltd, CS(OS) 642/2018 (Delhi HC, 9 Oct 2018)
[6] Jorawar Singh Mundy v Union of India, WP(C) 4482/2020 (Delhi HC, 8 Jan 2021)
[7] Subramanian Swamy v Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221
[8] K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1
[9] Suresh Chandra Sharma v State of UP, Habeas Corpus WP No. 233/2006 (Allahabad HC)
[10] Google LLC v Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) (2019) Case C-507/17, CJEU
[11] Delfi AS v Estonia (2015) 62 EHRR 6 (ECtHR Grand Chamber)
[12] Swapnil Tripathi v Supreme Court of India (2018) 10 SCC 639
[13] State of Punjab v Ramdev Singh (2004) 1 SCC 421
