INTRODUCTION
Consider if everything we protect with encryption, such as messages, transactions, and classified documents, could all be read in seconds, not by a fictional character in a movie, but on a real mechanical machine based on quantum physics. This is not science fiction; we are barreling towards that reality with continued advances in quantum computing.
Quantum computers use qubits, which are fundamentally different from the bits (0s and 1s) used in classical computing[1]. Qubits can do more than take on two states; they can be in more than one state, or form, at the same time. Meaning that quantum computers can develop processes at greater speeds than supercomputers today; things that would otherwise take a decade or century could happen in seconds[2]. The possibilities are astounding: new drugs, better AI, better and more complex systems that can all be optimized.
Again, the great possibilities of quantum computing entail great threats. Quantum computers threaten to obliterate any and all of the cryptography systems that secure our data and online security. They threaten to destroy the digital communication, finance, and regulatory underpinning of privacy. For governments and legal frameworks to avoid the catastrophic security event they need schools to create new systems and protections much quicker than quantum technology can advance.
THE QUANTUM THREAT TO EXISTING SYSTEMS
To examine the legal and security implications, we must initially understand what “leap” in the context of quantum computing means. While classical computers deal with data with a sequential mechanism, quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to execute a very large number of parallel calculations. Academic security matter relies on problems such as factoring large primes (RSA)[3] or solving elliptic curves (ECC) which classical machines take thousands of years to settle—quantum computing could settle the questions in moments.
The problem is, quantum computers could solve those problems in minutes, and they can do this through algorithms such as Shor’s (Shor’s Algorithm)[4]. The implications are astonishing:
- Digital Signatures: Digital signatures are required for online transactions, contracts, and identity verification[5]; quantum signatures could create forgeries for fraudulent transactions or identity theft.
- Banking & Payment Systems: The global banking system, which includes India’s UPI[6], is built on encryption standards that quantum computers could exploit in milliseconds, risking bank funds.
- Blockchain & Cryptocurrency: Cryptocurrencies, most notably Bitcoin, use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for security purposes[7]; quantum computing could succeed at breaking the access keys required to access wallets, thereby compromising entire blockchain ecosystems.
- National Security: Protection for military data, nuclear launch codes, and diplomatic correspondence is based on encryption we use today; quantum computing and quantum technologies could undermine these protections, leading, potentially, to some sort of global threat.
The world is starting to adapt. To this end, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is working on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards, or new cryptography algorithms using quantum resistance. However, the actual implementation of PQC through all forms of government and private enterprise, and the internet as a whole, will take time and will be longer than existing cryptography. Until all systems in the world adapt and implement completely protected PQC standards, we are exposed.
PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES
While quantum computing may be able to break encryption, it becomes a much worse consequence for nascent privacy regimes such as India’s DPDP Act, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[8], and California’s California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) — all of which heavily depend on encryption as a way to protect personal information. A particularly worrisome consequence is if we see more “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL) attacks, where hackers are harvesting valuable encryption data today—bank and payment details, medical details, private chats—for fulfilling hacking attempts, at some point in the future; while breaches in the future can roam for sensitive data from many years ago.
So consider the following:
- Healthcare Data: Confidential medical records stored electronically could be exposed, leading to discrimination in obtaining insurance, discrimination from a potential employer, and/or some type of exploitation[9].
- Financial Data: Old banking transactions, loan records, and/or tax filings could be decrypted, leading to criminal financial fraud years after the original data exchange.
- National Security: Old archived government records and documents, as well as classified intelligence stored for years without any fear of compromise, could now be exploited, significantly jeopardizing government sovereignty and potentially destabilizing international relations.
Cybersecurity experts are also worried about quantum-enhanced cyber warfare. Nation-states could utilize quantum computing power to hack an enemy nation’s defenses, manipulate financial markets, and disable critical infrastructure—think power grids or transportation networks.
If you add AI to the equation, you can start to see what a horrifying notion this is. Hackers could employ AI tools that operate on quantum machines independently of human intervention to scan for and exploit vulnerabilities quickly than anyone could defend[10]. This is why cybersecurity experts label quantum computing as the “nuclear hazard of the digital age.”
LEGAL GAPS AND THE ROAD AHEAD
Here is the problem: our laws are established for a reality that lacks a quantum evolution.
In India, the IT Act, 2000[11], and the DPDP Act, 2023[12], both require encryption for data protection. Both laws, however, do not use the term “quantum computing,” nor do they indicate a need for quantum-resistant systems; and our legislation assumes that strong encryption means strong security, as quantum computing renders this assumption invalid.
It is not much better internationally either. The GDPR does highlight encryption as a control, but does not plan for quantum threats in its encryption initiatives. The U.S. has taken an early step with the Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, 2022, which requires federal agencies to transition to quantum-safe encryption. However, this is a first step only.
There are significant issues posed by the lack of international standards for quantum security:
- Do governments require post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for critical infrastructure and banking systems?
- Who is responsible when a quantum hack occurs – companies, regulators, or hardware providers?
- How do we maintain crypto-agility – the ability to switch on new encryption and not collapse existing systems?
All these questions have to be answered. It would be disastrous to wait until quantum computing is mainstream.
BUILDING QUANTUM-SAFE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
To mitigate these risks, lawmakers and regulators must act now. Here are some key measures:
Mandate Quantum-Safe Encryption: Governments need to mandate sectors of critical need: banking, defense, and health, to use post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as soon as NIST publishes the standards for PQC[13].
International Cooperation: We need a global treaty modeled on the GDPR, establishing standards for quantum cybersecurity protection, and countries should be on the same page regarding data protection rules and the information that should be crypto-resilient.
Update Data Storage Regulations: Organizations that store sensitive data for decades need to transition to cryptography agile systems. Laws need to mandate systematic upgrades to cryptographic standards.
Clear Liability Frameworks: Establish accountability for breaches if data is stolen or breached by quantum computing, where victims can sue for damages, and to penalize organizations that fail to implement risk evaluation and prioritization[14].
Awareness & Training: Awareness training for legal workers, regulators, and C-Suite executives about quantum threats. If laws lack an awareness of quantum rules in advance, it is highly unlikely they will be instituted.
Quantum computing cannot be evil or condensed to just a villain. Quantum computing could help discover life-altering drugs, climate-related solutions, faster artificial intelligence, and many other problems society faces. However, without a solid legal structure and technical intervention to create legal and technical protections, we may usher in a “quantum apocalypse” in the cybersecurity and privacy landscape.
CONCLUSION
Quantum computing is potentially the greatest technological revolution of our age, as a double-edged sword that could advance human progress or dismantle the foundations that hold our digital trust together. We know that quantum computing could advance science, medicine, and artificial intelligence, but the potential for quantum systems to eclipse existing encryption systems also holds the ability to entrench global insecurity[15]. Moreover, the threat posed to the actual existence of our societies from undesired advances in quantum computing is one that we simply cannot ignore.
If we do not start now, it will not only be data breaches; we may see financial systems overthrown, national security threatened, and a complete collapse of our digital economy. The law has to adapt at a rate equal to technology, if not faster. The clarity is that the quantum era is coming, and the law cannot be late in adapting. Why suffer with mistakes of future advances when we can mobilize the resources available today to ensure tomorrow’s advances do not become the nightmares of late.
Author(s) Name: Yashi Saini (JIMS Engineering Management Technical Campus, Dept. of Law, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh)
References:
[1] Michael A Nielsen and Isaac L Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information (10th anniversary edn, CUP 2010) 13.
[2] Scott Aaronson, Quantum Computing since Democritus (CUP 2013) 75.
[3] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E Hellman, ‘New Directions in Cryptography’ (1976) 22(6) IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 644.
[4] Peter W Shor, ‘Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and Factoring’ (1994) Proceedings 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 124
[5] Information Technology Act 2000, s 3 (India) (recognition of digital signatures)
[6] Reserve Bank of India, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2023–24 (RBI 2024) ch 5
[7] Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008) https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf accessed 10 September 2025
[8] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1, arts 32–34
[9] Graham Greenleaf, ‘Health Privacy in a Quantum Age: Challenges for Regulators’ (2024) 6(2) Journal of Health Informatics & Law 45, 49
[10] Federal Trade Commission, Privacy and Data Security Update (FTC 2023) 19
[11] Information Technology Act 2000, s 43A
[12] Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, s 9 (India)
[13] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization: Finalized Algorithms (NIST, Aug 2024)
[14] Francis Rose, ‘The Evolution of the Species’ in Andrew Burrows and Alan Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (OUP 2006) 151.
[15] Kasim Balarabe, ‘Quantum Computing and the Law: Navigating the Legal Implications of a Quantum Leap’ (2025) 16 European Journal of Risk Regulation 794, 804–05 https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2025.8 accessed 09 September 2025.
