INTRODUCTION
The Indian Judiciary while discharging its duty of serving justice faces mounting challenges such as a smaller number of Judges in proportion to cases pending with nearly 5.3 crore cases pending in India[1] and the ratio of judges per million in India is approximately nine[2], lack of legal awareness leading to delay, poor infrastructure, complex procedural formalities, frequent adjournments, etc. These problems altogether lead to endless delay which adversely impacts the litigants who bear high costs of litigation and begin to lose trust in the Judicial system due to prolonged pendency. This mainly affects those from financially unstable backgrounds who are unable to bear the costs of lawyers and hence fear the tiresome process of courts. Taking into consideration these concerns the system of ‘legal aid’ was introduced to provide poor litigants with legal services in zero to minimal costs and ensure speedy justice. This was done through 42nd Amendment that inserted Article 39A[3] in the constitution which states about “equal justice and free legal aid” as a directive principle.
ROLE OF LOK ADALAT
Lok Adalat under the ambit of legal aid was created to eliminate the strict rules of procedure and evidence, Lok Adalat was formulated to offer an inexpensive, speedy, and easy alternative to court litigation through friendly resolution of cases. The provision seeks to provide justice to citizens without the difficulties and costs involved in formal court processes that often discourage citizens from pursuing their rights. As a civil court is conducting litigation in an informal and non-adversarial process, it aims to resolve disputes through an understanding of the circumstances provided by each party as opposed to involving contested judgments. It also has the power to settle compoundable criminal cases.
CONSTITUTION AND STRUCTURE OF LOK ADALAT
Lok Adalat are constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act[4], 1987, which is regulated by the National Legal Services Authority. Prior to the enactment of these acts, a Lok Adalat was in existence, although it was not given statutory authority. It started as an informal set of community councils. In 1982, a Lok Adalat campaign was initiated in Gujarat prior to any statutory authority for their decisions, but following its popularity it was given legal recognition and started taking on a statutory authority. Called a “people’s court,” the Lok Adalat tries to adjudicate disputes by way of conciliation, presided over by retired judges, judicial officers, lawyers, or social workers acting as conciliators. A Lok Adalat generally will consist of members such as the judicial officer acting as the chairman along with a lawyer (advocate) and social worker. Cases that may involve pre-litigation matters and matters pending in regular courts are sent to the Lok Adalat. There are also Permanent Lok Adalat that look only into matters related to public utility. The entire process is voluntary, and if both parties do not agree, it is not sent to Lok Adalat. If one party does not agree with the order for settlement at any time, it can come back to the high courts or are regularly constituted. Once an agreement is reached and consented by both the parties the Lok Adalat’s award becomes binding and final and no appeal against it can be initiated except for writ petitions that also on limited grounds.
QUANTITY VS QUALITY
The Lok Adalat works on the principle of compromise. The Hon’ble Court opined in State of Punjab and others v. Phulan Rani and another[5], that a compromise is “an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims by reciprocal modification of demands.” Thus, any decision that is completely inclined in one party’s favour cannot be termed as a compromise as the word compromise requires accommodation from both the sides. However, it is observed that as a result of the overemphasis on speedy trials and pressure of achieving settlement targets, the quality of justice is being compromised. Although without the voluntary consent of the litigants the finality of settlement cannot be held but various factors such as fear on part of the litigants to approach the regular courts[6] pertaining to the continued costs of litigation and delays acting as a barrier mainly for poor litigants , power imbalances, negligence on part of conciliators due to pressure of settling maximum cases in a short span, no cooling-off period for parties to reconsider settlement terms which may create rush in the minds of litigants, etc also lead to ‘coercive consent’ and thereby unjust outcome for one party. This coercive consent was mainly observed in Manju Gupta v National Insurance Company[7]. In this case, a 3 years old girl lost her two legs in a motor accident, her father claimed a sum of Rs.2.21 lakhs but as there was an inordinate delay the father agreed to settle the matter in Lok Adalat for an amount of Rs.30,000. Considering such gross injustice, the Allahabad high court took Suo moto action and awarded a sum of Rs.1,10,000 in compensation to the claimant. In this case, the said High Court also stated that the interests of fair play must not languish in the name of speedy justice, neglecting the parties’ interest than when the parties are minors, insane and disabled.[8] This implies that more emphasis is placed on deciding cases than on resolving disputes.
Another notable case is State of Punjab and others v. Phulan Rani and another[9],which is a Supreme Court case, this case proves that not only common man but powerful parties can also be aggrieved by the settlement outcome. This case revolves around the pension of the late husband of Phulan Rani which she claimed which she never received from the deceased’s employer that is corporation owned by the state of Punjab. The matter went to Lok Adalat and was settled in favour of Phulan Devi. However, later it was brought before the Supreme Court through a writ petition by the state of Punjab on the ground that the representatives of State of Punjab did not consent to the settlement. The Supreme Court established two criteria to evaluate the legality of the settlement in Lok Adalat. Initially, the court assessed whether there was mutual consent between all the parties involved in the dispute. Upon inquiry, it was established that the Punjab state and its officials had not consented to the settlement as proposed. Subsequently, the court engaged in an assessment of whether the settlement represented a true compromise. Since the Lok Adalat’s award completely granted Phulan Rani’s requests without any reciprocal adjustments, the Supreme Court ruled that this outcome did not constitute a proper compromise arrangement.
Another concern is that it is difficult to hold the judges accountable or apply the phrase “other principles of justice” as provided in 22D which defines procedure for permanent Lok Adalat[10]. This loophole limits the grounds to hold judges accountable to a great extent. These cases bear testimony to the fact that although Lok Adalat was constituted to administer justice in an uncomplicated process, in the course of achieving settlement goals it has neglected quality Justice to an extent.
CONCLUSION
The evaluation of Lok Adalat shows an unsettling inconsistency at the core of India’s alternative dispute resolution system. While these bodies were intended to drive change in democratizing access to justice and providing genuine dispute resolution to the everyday citizen, more and more evidence points to a focus on statistical disposal over real justice. The unbelievable pressure to dispose of the enormous backlog of cases has turned a process that could be slower and more considerate, into process without any consideration of individual claims or concerns where the goal is purely points on the board, instead of carrying out its original purpose to resolve disputes justly and fully.
The cases reveal systemic problems in the process when disputes become the volume driven function of how Lok Adalat are operating, especially supreme court cases that need counting. A settlement that is not reflective of actual compromise, a settlement that does not demonstrate mutual consent, and a resolution that does not settle a dispute, but rather defer it, shows that even the lowest courts do not fulfil their mandates. The desire to attain an average disposal point has created retention, but not relief, for many litigants.
Author(s) Name: Mahek Vejhurani (Pravin Gandhi College of Law)
References:
[1] Pradeep Thakur, ‘Why are 5.3cr cases pending in Indian courts? Missing lawyers & witnesses, long stays…’ The Times of India (28 September 2025) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-are-5-3cr-cases-pending-in-indian-courts-missing-lawyers-witnesses-long-stays-/articleshow/124187297.cms > accessed 28 September 2025.
[2] Dr Madabhushi Sridhar, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Negotiation And Mediation (1st edn, LexisNexis 2013)
[3] Constitution of India 1950, art 39A
[4] Legal Services Authorities Act 1987
[5] State of Punjab and Ors v Phulan Rani and Anr (2004) 7 SCC 555
[6] Vinita Choudhury, ‘THE FUNCTIONING OF LOK ADALATS IN INDIA— A CRITICAL ANALYSIS’ (2011) 2(1) NLIU Law Review <https://nliulawreview.nliu.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Volume-II-Issue-I-86-107.pdf> accessed 28 September 2025
[7] Manju Gupta v National Insurance Company Limited (1994) ACJ 1036
[8] Vijaykumar Shrikrushna Chowbe and Priya S Dhanokar, ‘Lok Adalat – A Strategic Forum for Speedy and Equitable Justice’ (2011) 1 The IUP Law Review <https://www.iupindia.in/1107/Law%20Review/Lok_Adalat_A_Strategic_Forum.html> accessed 28 September 2025
[9] State of Punjab and Ors v Phulan Rani and Anr (2004) 7 SCC 555
[10] Legal Services Authorities Act 1987, sec 22D
