INTRODUCTION
Digital connectivity is a contemporary tool that powers modern economies and governments. However, the backbone of digital connectivity is often mistaken for a ‘meta’ concept, but in reality, it depends heavily on physical infrastructure. Almost 95% of internet traffic is routed via submarine fibre optic cables.[1]. This includes online banking, cloud computing, and even critical diplomatic operations.
These submarine cables serve as critical infrastructure that is holding up the global economy in the 21st century, yet they fail to garner headlines and receive very little attention from the global academic and legal landscape. The concerns surrounding the undersea cables are not ‘What-ifs’ anymore and have translated into reality, as we have observed in the Red Sea and Baltic Sea.
In 2024, there were undersea cable cuts. Even though the official cause of the cuts remains undisclosed, it is speculated that tensions between Houthi rebels and Western powers may have resulted in cuts off the coast of Yemen. Four cables were damaged: SEACOM, TGN, AAE-1, and EIG. This had disrupted about 25% of traffic in West Asia and North Africa.
This is just one example of how vulnerable these networks are to accidental crossfire, planned sabotage, and geopolitical conflict.
As these concerns start shaping geopolitical reality, an important question arises in the legal sphere: “Does international law provide adequate legal protection to undersea cables?”
UNDERSTANDING THE BACKBONE OF DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY
A common belief is that satellites account for almost all of global connectivity and communications, but the truth is that only about 1% of traffic is transmitted by satellites. The Undersea Cable Network constitutes a complex mesh of around 600 such active cables spanning 1.4 kilometres all around the globe. [2] This network is responsible for connectivity across continents and connects financial institutions, military bases, and multinational corporations. Without fibre optics, global communications would be almost non-existent. Therefore, the consequences of damaging and disrupting these digital ecosystems are immense. Disruption in one such cable can slow down the internet across countries and pause financial transactions and crucial diplomatic and military communications.
SUBMARINE CABLES: A NATIONAL SECURITY ASSET
In 2010, the UN declared submarine cables to be “critical communications infrastructure” and “vitally important to the global economy and the national security of all states.”[3] The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) transmits 15 million messages to more than 8,300 banking organisations, securities institutions, and corporates in 195 countries every day.[4].
Submarine cables are not mere commercial or economic assets, but the military and intelligence infrastructure of all countries is dependent on them.
Another point that proves the criticality of these cables in defence is the establishment of the Global Information Grid (GiG) by the US Department of War. The GiG is the “globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to war fighters, policy makers and support personnel.”[5]
This proves that potential dangers to submarine cables put national security at risk.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION UNDER UNCLOS
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982, serves as the principal legal provision governing and protecting the undersea cables. Articles 58 and 79 of UNCLOS[6] Govern the laying of fibre optic cables in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), on the continental shelves and high seas. The key features of UNCLOS also include
- Article 112: The right of all countries to lay undersea cables. New cables laid must consider the existing cables and not disturb them
- Article 113 and Article 114: Laws to be adopted by States to punish damage and negligence towards submarine cables of others and of their own.
- Article 115: If damage is caused by fishing or anchoring, the parties are not to be held accountable unless they are proven to be negligent
The UNCLOS, as observed, only serves as an important provision to protect and provide rights for undersea cables during peacetime. It is irrelevant during times of armed conflict. Although Articles 113 and 114 urge states to adopt domestic laws to punish deliberate damage, there is no specific provision that can hold a particular state or organisation liable for damage caused to disrupt operations as a wartime strategy.
The International Humanitarian Law can fill certain holes regarding armed conflict that the UNCLOS fails to address.
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND DAMAGE DURING ARMED CONFLICT
The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has a few salient features, such as it urges states at war to distinguish between combatant and civilian institutions.[7] Therefore, deliberate damage to an undersea internet cable that is largely used for civilian communications violates IHL, but a cable used to aid specific military actions can bypass IHL.[8]
LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Other than the obvious limitation, which is the absence of specific provisions to govern damage to fibre optic cables during armed conflict, there is also the problem of ‘Attribution Challenges’. It is a practical difficulty in determining the parties responsible for the damage. Undersea cables are placed on the ocean shelves hundreds of meters below the water surface. Investigating damage on such a scale needs special equipment and extensive technical expertise. This also gives rise to an accountability gap and uncertainty. In these cases, it is specifically hard to garner credible evidence, causing legal remedies to be limited.
THE NEED FOR LEGAL REFORM
The growing critical and strategic importance of submarine cables indicates that the international community is in dire need of modern legislation to govern them. A set of laws must be made that protects these cables in the face of deliberate and strategic attacks. The international community must negotiate thoroughly to reach transparent and uniform standards for all states. Clearer mechanisms must be installed to repair, maintain, and protect the submarine cables.
Most importantly, procedures must be installed to investigate damage inflicted upon the undersea cables. These procedures must uphold the principle of neutrality.
CONCLUSION
Undersea cable is one of the most vital pieces of infrastructure, yet scarcely discussed, in the modern economic landscape. They facilitate global communications, banking, cloud computing, diplomatic, and military transactions. Despite their strategic importance, laws governing them are fragmented and don’t address the contemporary challenges regarding submarine cables.
While UNCLOS provides a basic foundation regarding the maintenance and laying of the cables, it fails to consider cases of hybrid warfare and deliberate sabotage. There is also no clarity on which organisations are liable to what degree when these damages occur.
Even though the cables are hidden under the oceans, their role in the contemporary world is very much tangible. Thus, the lack of a cohesive legal regime is going to be a potential Achilles heel for a lot of nation-states. The international community must collaborate with states and private entities responsible for the submarine cables to establish a meaningful and integrated set of provisions concerning the modern challenges posed by submarine cables.
Author(s)Name: Dikshita Deb (West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences)
References:
[1] Lionel Carter and others, Submarine Cables and the Oceans: Connecting the World (UNEP-WCMC Biodiversity Series No 31, International Cable Protection Committee, United Nations Environment Programme and UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre 2009) 5.
[2] UltramapGlobal, ‘The Biggest Threat to Subsea Cables’ (4 August 2024) < https://ultramapglobal.com/the- biggest-threat-to-subsea-cables/ > accessed 24 June 2026.
[3] UNGA Res 65/37, ‘Oceans and the Law of the Sea’ UN Doc A/RES/65/37 (7 December 2010).
[4] Douglas R Burnett, ‘Cable Vision’ (2011) 137(8) Proceedings (US Naval Institute).
[5] Michael Sechrist, ‘Cyberspace in Deep Water: Protecting Undersea Communications Cables By Creating an International Public-Private Partnership’ (Harvard Kennedy School, Policy Analysis Exercise, 23 March 2010) < https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cyberspace-deep-water-protecting-undersea-communications-cables-creating-international > accessed 26 June 2026
[6] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.
[7] Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287.
[8] TaxTMI, ‘Legal Status of Undersea Internet Cables During Armed Conflict Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) [Part 2 of 2]’ (12 May 2025) < https://www.taxtmi.com/article/detailed?id=14384 > accessed 26 June 2026.