INTRODUCTION
Similar to air, water is essential for human existence, farming, industries, and all forms of work. Every economy depends on water, so any kind of water dispute has the potential to impede a country’s growth and future. The inherent element of water makes these disputes quite important, which requires a thorough examination of existing challenges and desirable solutions. Water and water resources are subjects profound in the state list, so the power of adjudication rests with them in a peaceful scenario. Most of the river systems in India are distributed among various states, making it challenging for anyone to regulate them against the order of nature. The instances of disputes regarding rivers such as Kaveri, Krishna, Narmada, etc., have raised serious questions as to the governance of these matters. Uncertainty as to the role of the union and states imparts strains upon the inter-state relations within Indian federalism. While various enactments have already been legislated to solve these issues, the inefficiencies and complexities in the system deny them any opportunity for change.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
- The distribution of legislative subjects between the centre and states is contained in the 7th Schedule. Entry 17 of the State list entrusts the powers as to water resources, including supply, storage, irrigation, drainage, and canals. Entry 56 of the Union List gives authority to Parliament as to matters in relation to interstate rivers and river valleys which are considered in the public interest.[1]The first clause of Article 262 empowers the Parliament to regulate the manner of adjudication of any matter or dispute about the use, distribution, or regulation of any interstate rivers or river valleys.[2] The second clause of the same provision gives power to parliament to exclude water disputes from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or other courts in India.[3]
- Statutory Measures– River Boards Act, 1956[4]-This legislation provided for the creation of interstate boards that worked in consultation with state governments to provide advice on such interstate water conflicts. It was a kind of preventive and advisory mechanism to formulate cooperation between states and coordinate the development of such river systems. This idea never translated into the practical aspects of the application.
- Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956[5]-In case of recourse to the union government for the settlement of such disputes by two or more states, this enactment provided for initial resolution by a consultative process, and in the event of failure, made provisions for the establishment of a separate tribunal under the act to deal in particular with such disputes. It has the power to investigate, appoint assessors, and adjudicate such conflicts, and such adjudication is binding on all parties to such disputes. By the 2002 amendment, provisions as to time-bound establishment and adjudication by such tribunals were incorporated.[6]
CHALLENGES IN THE INTERSTATE WATER DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
Despite the presence of a statutory framework in place, interstate water disputes have constantly grown in numbers and have not been resolved even after several decades. This has been driven by various causes, some of which are as follows:
- Absence of Cooperative The concept of cooperative federalism calls for a collaborative approach by governments at all levels for mutual benefit. The sour relationship between differing central and state governments often halts collaborative efforts. While the central government has often avoided its responsibilities, states also have not taken this collaboration seriously due to an emphasis on their regional interests. The centre has been heavily criticised for ignorance of the interests and problems of people at the grassroots level in the settlement of these disputes. Sometimes, states also decline to abide by the advice of the union government or courts in these matters to secure their limited political interests in the state. Additionally, the establishment of institutions that give primacy to the centre in the resolution leads to unequal power distribution, which is opposed to the concept of holistic federalism.
- Ambiguity in Power Distribution expression “water” in the State List (Entry 17) is taken as water within the limits of the state, so states legislate entirely concerning water resources, irrespective of consideration as to their source or flow. Such appropriation of water is deemed fit until the Union government considers any possible prejudice to other states from such use, thereby prompting it to legislate in matters of “interstate waters”. This scheme of arrangement is quasi-federal, which is quite vague and uncertain in terms of jurisdiction. Thus, the distribution of jurisdiction is quite blurry, which hinders any kind of uniformity in water resource management.
- Passive Approach of The initial reasoning for handing over such power to the centre was the undefined nature of the boundaries of such river systems, so that no state could use the entire share of water resources within their territories, causing prejudice to other states.[7] Also, the inclusion of “economic planning” in the Concurrent List means the responsibility is vested in the centre for a collaborative approach with the concerned states. However, the union government has often ignored these obligations in a bid to secure its limited political interest and harmonious relations with the state governments.[8]Ineffective regulation of such disputes has provided blanket immunity to states to gain access to unregulated waters, primarily based on historical arrangements.
- Politicisation of Dispute-Water has become a source of politics, especially for regional parties in a multi-party setup, which hinders the efficient resolution of disputes. Local groups, while advocating for regional identity and problems, neglect the larger national interest, which often leads to vote bank politics. [9]Even the fear of loss of vote bank in such areas leads the central union not to take any kind of active role in such conflicts. The nature of dispute resolution, which makes it advantageous for one and adverse for another, clearly disturbs the politics within the state and between the states.
- Ineffective Resolution organisations have been outdated and ineffective due to long-term delays and the ineffective execution of awards passed by them. Unlike courts, these bodies do not possess a definite authority for the strict application of their decisions, which diminishes the confidence of states in resorting to such tribunals for resolution. Sometimes, the dispute resolution often ignores aspects of the distribution of land, water, and related production activities, which affects the credibility of such adjudication.
RECOMMENDATORY FRAMEWORK
Cooperative federalism, in its essence, is the fundamental mechanism for the prevention, resolution, and disposal of such disputes. There is a growing necessity on the part of the central government to take a more proactive role in such disputes and water management in India while ensuring the delicate balance between national and regional interests. The transformation of the current quasi-federal model into a cooperative one is the need of the hour.
Such a drastic change in centre-state relations has to be done in a way that ensures an equation of collaboration with proportional roles and responsibilities for all parties to the dispute. It can be said that the stakeholders in such disputes ought to be given some representation in the actual decision-making process. A clear demarcation of the level of interference puts responsibility and restraint on the union government to exercise its powers in a proper way for the cause.
While several interstate river disputes, such as Cauvery and Ravi-Beas, have remained unsolved even after the expiry of decades and adjudication by the tribunal, some of these disputes have been solved due to efficient negotiations between the states. This clearly underscores the inefficient nature of the functioning of such tribunals in adjudication. The role of parties is quite important in the settlement of their mutual tensions, which should initially be done through mediation and mutual agreement. Ramifications have to be done in existing interstate water tribunals to ensure the proper functioning, devoid of long-term delays and proper execution of their orders, which instills confidence in parties to disputes. Also, a comprehensive water management entity has to be established to deal with the concept of water at all levels of governance.
CONCLUSION
Even after the passage of decades, the resolution of interstate water disputes has remained a complex problem for Indian federalism and the practice of equitable water management. These conflicts are unique in themselves, thus requiring resolution based on different approaches and methods. The age-old constitutional and statutory measures are not effective for efficient dispute resolution. Several statutory reforms and the change in the approach of the union and state governments are the need of the hour. By adopting comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable measures, India can boost the idea of cooperative federalism and secure efficient water resource management for future generations. The centre-state relationship is the major facilitator, so these governments have to adopt a positive, wide outlook to serve their dual interest.
Author(s) Name: Sumit Kumar (University Five Year Law College, Jaipur, Rajasthan)
References:
[1] Constitution of India 1950, sch VII
[2] Constitution of India 1950, art 262(1)
[3] Constitution of India 1950, art 262(2)
[4] River Boards Act 1956
[5] Inter-State River Water Disputes Act,1956
[6] Inter-State Water Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2002
[7] Raj Pipara and Nandini Verma, ‘Critical Analysis of Article 262 in Light of Major Water Disputes’ (2021) International Journal of Law Management & Humanities <https://www.ijlmh.com/wp-content/uploads/Critical-Analysis-of-Article-262-in-Light-of-Major-Water-Disputes.pdf> accessed 22 May 2025
[8] Sayanangshu Modak, Ambar Kumar Ghosh and J.M. Mauskar, ‘Federalism and Interstate River Water Governance in India’ (Observer Research Foundation, 14 January 2021) <https://www.orfonline.org/research/federalism-and-interstate-river-water-governance-in-india> accessed 20 May 2025
[9]R.B. Shah, ‘Inter‐state river water disputes: A historical review’ (1994) International Journal of Water Resources Development <https://doi.org/10.1080/07900629408722621> accessed 23 May 2025
