INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 2026, U.S. forces executed a military raid in Caracas (Venezuela) and captured President Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores to face narco-terrorism charges in New York[1]. This intervention challenges sovereign immunity and international legal norms, sparking debate over its legality. The core of the U.S. prosecution is the charge of ‘narco-terrorism’, which is defined as the involvement or linkage of terrorist or insurgent organisations with narcotic trafficking, either through direct participation or by using drug-related profits to finance political violence and coercive activities against governments[2]. The statute of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) allows for expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction if the drug activity occurs even partially outside the United States and affects U.S. commerce or targets U.S. citizens[3].
While the MDLEA is primarily known for its application to vessels on the high seas, its jurisdictional framework and related provisions under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 extend to aircraft and extraterritorial conspiracies[4].
The U.S. government bases its case on the “Cartel of the Suns” (Cartel de los Soles) theory, alleging that Maduro has led a network of military and political elites that used state power to protect narcotics trafficking for over two decades. Specifically, the 2026 superseding indictment alleges that Maduro facilitated the shipment of 200 to 250 tons of cocaine annually by 2020 through partnerships with groups like the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army).[5]
DOES THE U.S. HAVE AMPLE PROOF?
Whether the U.S. has ample proof or not remains highly contested. The prosecution relies on high-level cooperators, such as former military intelligence chief Hugo “El Pollo” Carvajal, who pleaded guilty in 2025 to narco-terrorism and confirmed the Cartel of the Suns’ existence[6]. Other evidence includes recorded meetings from 2015 where Maduro’s nephews discussed shipping cocaine from the presidential hangar. However, contradictions exist; for instance, the U.S. indictment links Maduro to the Tren de Aragua gang, yet a 2025 U.S. intelligence community assessment found no coordination between that gang and the Venezuelan government.[7] Furthermore, Cilia Flores is charged with cocaine importation and weapons offenses—accused of accepting bribes to broker meetings—but not the narco-terrorism count itself. But the evidences related to the present case are hearsay in nature. There is no paper trail, or any material evidence against President Maduro or Cilia Flores[8].
AMERICAN LAW: INHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
The Trump administration justifies the Caracas raid under the “inherent constitutional authority” of the President as established in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. This authority is derived from the “Vesting Clause”, which grants the executive power to the President and the “Commander-in-Chief” power. This may create a “grab bag” of powers that includes protecting national security and punishing international threats.
Specifically, the administration cites the President’s power to repel sudden attacks, framing the influx of narcotics as a form of non-kinetic warfare that justifies defensive force without a formal declaration of war from Congress. This position is supported by a 1989 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum, which asserts that the President has the authority to order extraterritorial arrests of fugitives even if such actions violate customary international law by intruding on foreign sovereignty. However, it is argued this violates the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which restricts military hostilities to situations involving a declaration of war or a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States.
LEGALITY UNDER VENEZUELAN LAW
From the perspective of Venezuelan law, the U.S. operation is an illegal kidnapping and a violation of the 1999 Constitution. Articles 1 and 13 of the Venezuelan Constitution declare independence and sovereignty as irrevocable rights and prohibit foreign military facilities on national soil. The Venezuelan Penal Code, specifically Articles 129 and 132, criminalizes conspiring with a foreign nation against state integrity or requesting foreign intervention to overthrow the government. Moreover, Venezuelan authorities view the capture as an unlawful abduction of a sitting leader.
LEGALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under international law, the attack is widely viewed as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. While the U.S. cites Article 51 (self-defence), international legal scholars argue that narcotics smuggling does not meet the threshold of an “armed attack” required to justify military force. Furthermore, as a sitting head of state, Maduro arguably enjoys immunity ratione personae (personal immunity), which prohibits foreign criminal jurisdiction. The U.S. bypasses this by refusing to recognize Maduro as a legitimate president, a political determination that courts generally defer to.
ADJUDICATION, BIAS, AND THE $50 MILLION REWARD
The trial in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) is governed by the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, given in the judgments of Ker v Illinois[9] and Frisbie v Collins[10]. This long-standing but questionable U.S. Supreme Court precedent holds that a court’s power to try a criminal defendant is not impaired by the fact that the defendant was brought before the court via “forcible abduction.” Essentially, the court treats the “indisputable illegality” of the kidnapping as irrelevant to its domestic jurisdiction.
Concerns of bias are central to the defence’s strategy. An American jury, drawn from the local Manhattan community, may be influenced by government rhetoric regarding the fentanyl crisis or Maduro’s role as a dictator, leading to claims of ‘victor’s justice.’ Additionally, the U.S. State Department’s $50 million reward[11] for Maduro’s capture—the highest in the program’s history—presents a major opportunity for the defence to discredit witnesses. Defence lawyers will likely argue that such a reward buys testimony, incentivizing witnesses to manufacture evidence or provide secondary confessions to secure massive payouts or sentence reductions.
Furthermore, the secrecy rules for National Security found in the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) allow the U.S. to withhold specific evidence from Maduro’s lawyers. Under CIPA Section 4, the government can provide “unclassified summaries” or delete classified information from discovery entirely if it deems that disclosing it would damage national security. This could prevent the defence from seeing intelligence on how the raid was conducted or identifying specific informants within the Venezuelan military, thus crippling justice.
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND ALTERNATIVE VENUES
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is often suggested as a more neutral venue, yet its jurisdiction is limited. While the ICC can prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity in Venezuela (which it has been investigating since 2023), it lacks jurisdiction over the “crime of aggression” in this case because the U.S. is not a party to the Rome Statute. The Court can only hear an aggression case against a non-member if the UN Security Council refers it, which the U.S. would block using its veto power.
Assuming a U.S. trial is unfair, historical models offer alternatives:
- Trying suspects in a neutral third country (e.g., the Netherlands) under the law of the relevant jurisdiction to increase the perception of impartiality. One such example is the Lockerbie Tribunal[12].
- The Hissène Habré trial in Senegal utilized a court created by the African Union and Senegal, employing both regional and international judges to balance local sovereignty and international standards[13]. Therefore, a hybrid model of this kind could also enhance fairness.
PREVENTING FUTURE ATTACKS AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW
Current international laws prohibit such attacks but they lack enforcement mechanisms against superpowers. Proposals to strengthen these laws include the following:
- Restricting the use of the Security Council veto in cases involving crimes of aggression or mass atrocities.
- Requiring states that initiate “law enforcement” military actions to seek an immediate provisional ruling from the International Court of Justice.
- Amending the Rome Statute to allow the ICC to prosecute aggression regardless of the state’s membership status.
- A transformational agenda proposed by scholars in 2025 to create a more representative Security Council and a standing UN Peace Force to replace unilateral state actions.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. attack on Venezuela represents a collision between domestic criminal enforcement and the fundamental principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention. While U.S. law provides a template for executive action through Article II and narco-terrorism statutes, these actions remain in profound conflict with the international legal order established under the UN Charter.
Author(s) Name: Arunika Paul Nandi (Dr. B. R. Ambedkar National Law University)
References
[1] ‘Why did the US attack Venezuela?’ (Britannica) <https://www.britannica.com/question/Why-did-the-U-S-attack-Venezuela> accessed 10 January 2026.
[2] Daniel Boyce, ‘Narco-Terrorism’ (1987) 56(11) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 24.
[3] Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, Title 46, Subtitle VII, Chapter 705.
[4] Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, s. 511(a)(4), s.1009.
[5] ‘The Charges Against Nicolas Maduro: What the Indictment Alleges’ (Jurist, 5 January 2026). <https://www.jurist.org/features/2026/01/05/the-charges-against-nicolas-maduro-what-the-indictment-alleges/> accessed 10 January 2026
[6] ‘Hugo Carvajal: Former Venezuela spy chief pleads guilty to US drug charges’ BBC News (27 June 2025) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c87312qgpzgo> accessed 10 January 2026.
[7] ‘How cocaine and corruption led to Maduro’s indictment’ AP News (8 January 2026) <https://apnews.com/article/maduro-indictment-justice-department-trump-bondi-25a6fbd922472296c744eb5111cd914c> accessed 10 January 2026.
[8] ‘The Charges Against Nicolas Maduro: What the Indictment Alleges’ (n 5).
[9] 119 US 436 (1886).
[10] 342 US 519 (1952).
[11] ‘Nicolás Maduro Moros’ (US Department of State) <https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros> accessed 10 January 2026
[12] John P Grant, ‘Lockerbie Trial’, (last updated January 2013) in MPIL, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP), <https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e60>, accessed 10 January 2026.
[13] ‘The Trial of Hissène Habré’ (Human Rights Watch) <https://www.hrw.org/tag/trial-hissene-habre> accessed 10 January 2026.
