INTRODUCTION
Religion is a calming, philosophical, and cultural aspect of one’s life. It refers to adherence to some specific beliefs and rituals that provide a human being with answers to questions of existentialism. It encompasses age-old practices and beliefs turned into rituals, followed by millions of people. Though religion is meditation, sometimes it is the biggest cause of conflict between different communities professing different ideologies. Thus, our judicial system has from time to time interpreted and invented various lines of constitution to avoid dispute due to stopping religious groups and sections from propagating their religion. Constitutional Article 25 ensures the protection of an individual’s religious rights. The judiciary, through its rulings, has established the essential religious practices doctrine as a pivotal guiding principle.
ARTICLE 25
Constitutional Article 25 safeguards the right to exercise, declare, and promote an individual’s religious beliefs. This provision underscores the secular nature of Indian governance, which was considered its fundamental underpinning. It is crucial to highlight that this entitlement extends to all individuals, irrespective of their nationality, and is not confined to Indian citizens alone.
RESTRICTIONS TO THE ARTICLE 25
The scope of Article 25 is not boundless, as it incorporates specific limitations related to public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights outlined in Part 3 of the Constitution. Both this article and the associated right are not unconditional, allowing the State to impose rational restrictions and oversee the observance of a particular religious practice. The pertinent queries revolve around determining the practices that should be allowed and those that should not.[1]
THE PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE PERMITTED PRACTICES
The Indian judicial system developed a doctrine to define the essence of religion, focusing on core practices that are fundamental to one’s faith. This doctrine states that only behaviours that constitute the core foundation of a religion should be significant in disagreements between religious groups. At the same time, unrelated aspects are not important and do not deserve constitutional protection.
TEST FOR ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE:
In the legal matter involving Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadisharananda Avadhuta,[2] the assessment focused on determining whether a particular practice falls within the realm of essential or not.The apex court ruled that the essentiality of practice in religion depends on whether it will alter its true nature without it. The court asserted that a segment could be deemed essential or integral “if the elimination of that component or custom could lead to a fundamental alteration like that religion or its convictions.”
DIGGING INTO IT’S ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
- The Shirur Mutt Case (1954):
The essential religious practices doctrine originated in the 1954 case known as the ‘Shirur Mutt Case,’ specifically The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmidar Thirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt[3]. This landmark case marked the formulation of the doctrine, emphasizing a distinction between religious and secular practices. The ruling asserted that constitutional protection was reserved exclusively for religious practices deemed essential and integral, highlighting their significance within a religion, while secular activities, though associated with the religion, did not receive the same level of protection.
- Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore[4] (1958):
The judiciary rendered a significant verdict, marking a shift in judicial philosophy and empowering the court to play a decisive role in determining the qualification of a religious practice as fundamental.
- Sardar Sarup Singh v State of Punjab[5] (1959):
In this particular instance, the SC applied the essential religious practices doctrine to affirm the legality of section 148-B within ‘The Sikh Gurudwaras Act, of 1925.’ The court observed that no conclusive evidence had been provided to demonstrate that the religion inherently mandated the direct election of the entire Sikh Community to the Gurudwara Committees responsible for management.
- Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali[6] (1961):
The Supreme Court dismissed challenges against the ‘Dargah Khwaja Saheb Act of 1955,’ asserting that the shrine was not exclusively reserved for members of the Soofi Chistia Order, and the claim for exclusive custodianship was deemed without merit. The court emphasised that, for a practice to be eligible for protection, it must be considered indispensable to one’s religious beliefs.
- Sardar Syedna Taher Saiffuddin Saheb v State of Bombay[7] (1962):
The Indian Supreme Court determined that levying taxes on the income of religious leaders through endowments did not violate their freedom of religion, by Article 26(b) of the Constitution of India.
- Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India[8] (1995):
In this case, the courtruled that mosques and Santharas are not essential components of Islam and Jainism, respectively, based on their relative importance.
- Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadisharananda Avadhuta[9] (2004):
In evaluating the Ananda Marga Faith’s Tandava Dance, the court applied the essential religious practices criterion. Despite High Court recognition, the majority deemed it non-essential, emphasizing that the absence of practice must fundamentally alter the religion for it to be deemed essential.[10]
- The Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. The State of Kerela and Ors (Sabrimala case 2006)[11]:
In the Sabarimala case, the Indian Supreme Court concluded that the restriction barring women aged 10-50 from entering the Sabarimala shrine did not qualify as an essential religious practice safeguarded by Article 25 of the Indian Constitution, as it did not align with the principles of gender equality.
- Shayara Bano v Union of India[12] (2017):
In this particular instance, the Supreme Court declared the practice of ‘Triple Talaq’ unconstitutional. Employing the doctrine of essential religious practices, the court noted that Triple Talaq contradicts the principles of the Quran and, therefore, does not qualify for protection under Article 25 of the constitution. The court emphasized that an activity permitted or not expressly forbidden by religion cannot be deemed an essential or affirmative doctrine endorsed by that particular faith.
- Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka[13] (2022):
The court determined that donning the hijab does not qualify as an Essential Religious Practice and, consequently, does not warrant protection under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The court clarified that wearing the hijab is not inherently a religious practice but rather a cultural one. The hijab, according to the court, originated as a measure aimed at ensuring the safety of women and was linked to the socio-cultural circumstances prevailing at the time of the Quran’s composition. It was deemed not to be an intrinsic aspect of the religion.[14]
CRITICISM
The approach to determining cases under Article 25 in courts is criticized for granting excessive authority and lack of unbiased guidelines for judges. The Kerala and Bombay High Courts, in the legal matters of Fathema Hussain Sayed v. Bharat Education Society[15] and Amnah Bint Basheer v. Central Board of Secondary Education, arrived at disparate conclusions despite being rooted in the interpretation of a common Quranic passage, differed in their conclusions. Kerala High Court deemed wearing a hijab a high Islamic requirement, while Bombay High Court ruled it unnecessary. Critics argue that the court has focused on clerical functions rather than protecting individual rights.
CONCLUSION
The essential religious practices doctrine in India has facilitated the judiciary in ascertaining the fundamental nature of the practice. However, it has drawbacks, questioning its reliability. Courts balance religion and population interests, ensuring the nation’s future and various religions. But the courts should also consider some alternatives accompanying this theory to make the widest combination possible that may help in removing the flaws that are trying to narrow down the scope of this doctrine.
Author(s) Name: Krishi Mittal (University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh)
Reference(s):
[1] Kartik Piyush Panchal et al, ‘The Essential Religious Practice Test/ Doctrine of Essentiality’ (Pen Acclaims, 11 July 2020) <Kartik-Panchal.pdf (penacclaims.com)> accessed 21 July 2023
[2] Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadisharananda Avadhuta 4 SCC 522
[3] The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmidar Thirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt, (1954) AIR 282.
[4]Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958) AIR 255
[5] Sardar Sarup Singh v. State of Punjab (1959) AIR 860
[6] Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961) AIR 1402
[7] Sardar Syedna Taher Saiffuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay (1962) AIR 853
[8]Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India AIR (1995) SC 605 A
[9] Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadisharananda Avadhuta (n 5)
[10]Supreme Court Observer, ‘Essential Religious Practices: Court in Review’ (Supreme Court Observer, 4th Sep 2017)<https://www.scobserver.in/journal/essential-religious-practices-court-in-review/>accessed 21 July 2023
[11] The Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. The State of Kerela and OrsW.P (C) No. 373/2006
[12]Shayara Bano v Union of India AIR (2017) 9 SCC 1
[13]Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka WP (C) No. 120 (2022)
[14]‘Hijab Ban Judgment Summary (Karnataka HC)’(Supreme Court Observer, 15th Mar 2022)<https://www.scobserver.in/reports/hijab-ban-judgment-summary-karnataka-hc/> accessed 21 July 2023
[15] Fathema Hussain Sayed v. Bharat Education Society AIR (2003) Bom 75
.
