INTRODUCTION
On 3 August 2026, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court addressed an important statutory interpretation question concerning the scope of matrimonial cruelty under criminal law: whether the expression “husband” in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) can encompass a man in a relationship like marriage where a legally valid marriage between the parties is absent or disputed.[1] In Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.,[2] the Court held that Section 498A can apply to such a relationship, provided the union possesses the substance and characteristics of marriage and an intention to marry forms an intrinsic part of the relationship. The Bench expressly confined this purposive interpretation to Section 498A itself, declining to establish a universal rule that every statutory reference to a “husband” extends to unmarried partners. The decision provides critical guidance on the intersection of penal liability for matrimonial cruelty and civil remedies for non-formal domestic relationships.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
The complainant alleged that she married the appellant, Dr. Lokesh B.H., according to Hindu rites in October 2010 and cohabited with him in Bengaluru. Following the breakdown of the relationship in 2016, she lodged criminal complaints alleging dowry harassment, physical cruelty, and that Lokesh had concealed a subsisting earlier marriage. Charges were subsequently framed under Section 498A read with related IPC provisions and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.[3]
Lokesh moved the High Court of Karnataka under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to quash the proceedings.[4] He contended that because no legally valid marriage existed between the parties, he could not fall within the statutory term “husband” for Section 498A. The High Court refused to quash the prosecution, reasoning that a man who represents himself as a husband and leads a woman to believe she is in a valid marriage cannot subsequently rely on the legal invalidity of that marriage to resist prosecution. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging whether this rationale could sustain criminal proceedings under Section 498A.
THE QUESTION OF “HUSBAND”
Section 498A criminalises cruelty inflicted on a woman by her “husband or the relative of her husband.” The appellant urged a strict construction of the provision, arguing that penal statutes must be construed strictly according to their plain text. On this view, Parliament chose the term “husband,” which presupposes a valid marriage rather than broader terms such as “partner,” and courts cannot judicially expand a penal provision beyond its enacted terms. The appellant further highlighted that a woman in a non-formal relationship is not left without legal recourse, as civil protection remains available under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA).[5]
Conversely, the complainant contended that Section 498A is a beneficial penal provision enacted to curb the social evil of cruelty within domestic unions that resemble marriage. This argument relied on Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam,[6] where the Supreme Court recognized that the protection of Section 498A could not be defeated merely by an accused asserting that a marriage was legally invalid, particularly where he had represented the complainant as his wife.
The Supreme Court in Lokesh B.H. examined these competing positions to determine whether the statutory expression “husband” could encompass relationships that lack formal legal validity but possess the essential attributes of a marital relationship.
THE SCOPE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Division Bench, comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, adopted a purposive interpretation while maintaining that strict construction of penal statutes does not require rigid literalism. The Court held that the word “husband” in Section 498A is not restricted solely to a man joined to the complainant by a formally valid marriage. It extends to a man in a relationship “in the nature of marriage,” provided that the relationship displays the substance and characteristics of a marital union and an intention to marry forms an intrinsic element.
In evaluating whether a relationship possesses the nature of marriage, the Bench referred to principles developed under PWDVA jurisprudence. Rather than importing the PWDVA framework wholesale into criminal law, the Court drew upon decisions such as D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma[7] as judicial guidance for identifying the characteristics of a marital relationship. The Court emphasised a cumulative and contextual evaluation involving several indicative factors:
- Duration of Cohabitation: A lengthy period of cohabitation may support the inference of a marital relationship, though duration alone is not determinative.
- Shared Household and Social Representation: Whether the parties maintained a common household and publicly presented themselves as spouses within their social circles.
- Financial and Social Interdependence: The degree to which the parties pooled resources, shared domestic responsibilities, and functioned as a family unit.
The Bench affirmed that no single factor automatically establishes or precludes a relationship in the nature of marriage. The overall nature and substance of the relationship must be assessed cumulatively.
The Court’s reasoning engaged with traditional canons of interpretation, referencing the mischief rule traced to Heydon’s Case as part of its discussion on purposive construction.[8] The Bench examined the legislative history and Statement of Objects and Reasons behind the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act 1983,[9] which introduced Section 498A to tackle cruelty by husbands and their relatives, particularly harassment linked to unlawful demands for property or valuable security. While Section 304B IPC separately criminalises dowry death, Section 498A focuses on preventing domestic cruelty. The Court observed that legislative history illuminates the statutory purpose, ensuring that purposive interpretation operates within the statutory text without creating an entirely new offence.
The Court also distinguished earlier authorities cited during arguments. U. Suvetha v. State primarily addressed who qualifies as a “relative of the husband” under Section 498A. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Reema Aggarwal[10] addressed challenges to the legal validity of a marriage where representation and holding-out as spouses were present. Lokesh B.H. developed these principles by formalising the criteria required to bring a relationship in the nature of marriage within the scope of Section 498A. The Supreme Court answered the core legal question but did not adjudicate the disputed factual allegations, leaving those for determination at the appropriate stage in the criminal proceedings.
ANALYTICAL CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The judgment addresses a delicate balance between social protection and judicial restraint. From a protective standpoint, the decision reduces the disparity between civil remedies under the PWDVA and criminal protection under Section 498A for women in relationships resembling marriage. Where a relationship possesses the substance, intention, and social character of a marriage, an accused cannot escape Section 498A liability solely by alleging that no legally valid marriage existed.
From the standpoint of judicial restraint, criminal statutes require clear notice of prohibited conduct to satisfy constitutional due process. Expanding statutory terminology through judicial interpretation must remain grounded in legislative intent to respect the separation of powers. The Union of India contended that remedies under Section 498A were historically conceived for married women and that cohabitation alone does not constitute marriage. The Bench reconciled these concerns by confining its holding strictly to Section 498A and requiring a high threshold of proof regarding the marital character of the relationship.
The responsibility of applying this standard falls upon trial courts, which are charged with assessing evidence and applying legal tests to disputed facts. The central practical challenge lies in applying this fact-sensitive standard consistently without allowing casual cohabitation to be routinely treated as a relationship in the nature of marriage.
PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)[11] substantially corresponds to Section 498A IPC. Because the operative statutory language has been carried forward, the interpretive principles laid down in Lokesh B.H. will remain relevant to proceedings under Section 85 BNS, subject to temporal applicability and statutory transition rules.
Procedurally, the judgment does not create a universal or mandatory preliminary evidentiary hearing in every prosecution involving unmarried cohabitants. Instead, it introduces an additional legal and factual inquiry where Section 498A is invoked in a non-formal relationship.
At the quashing stage under Section 482 CrPC (or Section 528 BNS), High Courts can quash proceedings if the uncontroverted material demonstrates that the relationship lacks the essential characteristics of a marriage. However, where the nature of the relationship depends upon disputed facts, the issue must be tried alongside the merits of the case.
CONCLUSION
Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka clarifies the scope of the word “husband” under Section 498A IPC by extending its protective reach to relationships in the nature of marriage that display both marital substance and an intention to marry. By drawing on PWDVA jurisprudence while keeping Section 498A within its statutory boundary, the Supreme Court has provided a structured standard for criminal courts. The lasting significance of the judgment lies in its careful balancing of protective penal interpretation with statutory restraint, requiring courts to conduct a rigorous factual inquiry into the true character of non-formal domestic unions.
Author(s) Name: Asfa I Shaikh (KLE College of Law, Navi Mumbai (affiliated to Mumbai University))
References:
[1] Indian Penal Code 1860, s 498A.
[2] Dr Lokesh B H v State of Karnataka 2026 INSC 784.
[3] Dowry Prohibition Act 1961.
[4] Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 482.
[5] Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, s 2(f).
[6] Reema Aggarwal v Anupam (2004) 3 SCC 199.
[7] D Velusamy v D Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469; Indra Sarma v VKV Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755.
[8] Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, 76 ER 637.
[9] Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act 1983.
[10] U Suvetha v State (2009) 6 SCC 757; Rajinder Singh v State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477.
[11] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, s 85.