INTRODUCTION
In 2026, the Delhi High Court dealt with a peculiar case, a bail application wherein the accused had been in a relationship with the woman since college days. He repeatedly promised marriage to the woman and even introduced her to his family. However, he later refused to marry her stating the reason of a “kundali (horoscope) mismatch”. The court denied bail stating that if horoscope mismatch was going to be a deciding factor for his family, then it should have been addressed earlier. The constant reassurances followed by a last-minute refusal to marry raises the question of deceit under Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023[1]. This case, however, exposes a deeper question. Why does the law, in 2026, still evaluate a woman’s consent to sexual intercourse by asking the question of promise to marriage first?
WHAT DOES SECTION 69 LOOK AT?
The aim of Section 69 of BNS is to criminalise sexual intercourse obtained through “deceitful means”, specifically including a false promise of marriage, made with no intention of fulfilling it. The punishment is up to 10 years imprisonment and a fine. It is a non- bailable and cognisable offence[2]. This provision was added after cases came up wherein consent was induced by a false promise to marry, getting added in either Section 375 (rape) or 415 (cheating) of IPC, neither of them fully fitting or catering to the parties. Hence, Section 69 created a standalone offence which acknowledges deception as a distinct form of harm than physical force. The goal was to protect women from exploitation but the logic under Section 69 needs reform.
ADDRESSING THE FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 69
Section 69 works on the basis of the consent of the woman. The question asked is why she consented and whether consent would have existed if not for a promise to marry at the end. If the promise was fraudulent from inception, then her consent is invalidated and Section 69 is attracted. This reasoning, however, connects a woman’s consent and her autonomy of sexual decision making to matrimonial expectations. The provision implies that marriage is the end goal and the only socially acceptable reason as to why a woman would consent to sexual intercourse. The woman’s consent is not treated as a standalone decision taken by an autonomous adult woman but assessed with reference to her relationship and against the background of the promise made about the future.
This brings to light a wider problem. A woman is considered to be incapable of giving consent outside marriage thereby undermining her agency. The provision at hand thus ends up having a regressive, patriarchal and conservative understanding of female sexuality and intimacy, assuming that it is only when there exists a legitimate framework of marriage or a promise thereof that a woman can give her consent to sexual intercourse and not otherwise.
The argument here is that the consent framework built around this provision only recognizes harm caused when matrimonial expectations play an important role and leaves out while also disadvantaging women who give consent to sexual intercourse without having a pretext of marriage attached at all. Consequently, marriage is seen as a proxy for consent, without which a woman’s consent holds no value. The law does not address non- marital consensual sexual intercourse or coercion faced by a woman which does not rest on the promise of marriage, instead, consent is solely based on the existence of a credible marriage or the absence thereof.
WHAT ROLE DOES THE COURT PLAY?
The flawed understanding of this provision is now seen in the reasoning provided by judges regarding women’s autonomy and agency, in the various cases addressed by them ever since the provision was introduced.
In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v State of Maharashtra (2024), the Supreme Court held that because the case involved a nine-year relationship between the partners, it implies a physical relationship between them, without protest and insistence by the female for marriage, further emphasizing that the relationship is consensual than based on a false promise of marriage[3]. This reasoning, however, requires the woman to establish compromised consent, consistent protesting and insistence on marriage. The onus is on her conduct and her repeated demands that on what the accused did, concealed or fabricated[4]. It is understood that a woman who did not repeatedly assert any sort of matrimonial expectation is consenting freely to the terms of the relationship. This is a risky reasoning which shifts the lens from what the accused did to what the woman failed to assert.
WHAT DOES THE KUNDALI MISMATCH CASE SHOW?
The Delhi High Court case was clear in this regard. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma located the root of the problem in the accused’s conduct than the complainant’s expectations from the relationship. She noted that if kundali mismatch had been a non-negotiable for the family then it should’ve been raised by the accused before any sort of sexual intimacy was established, thereby focusing on the accused[5]. But even this case went through the similar consent paradox issue faced in other cases. The fundamental question in this case was whether she would have consented to sexual intercourse had she known that kundali mismatch would be used as a reason to end the promise of marriage, the reason on which her consent stood. This showcases how the fundamental question is still about matrimonial expectations and not about deception by the accused. The court in this case was able to manage the consent paradox but not every case would have such clear facts and documentation of assurances which will make it easier to locate the deception of the accused than the expectation of the complainant.
A REFORM IN THE FRAMEWORK
The consent problem in Section 69 is not unique to India. Countries around the world have tried to address deception in relationships without building the solution on the assumption being on the reason women consent and on what grounds.
A way for the law to have a narrower framework is by ensuring that the focus of the law is entirely on deception and not getting into the question of the link between consent and marriage. The provision would hence only focus on criminalizing deliberate and premeditated fabrication of identity, marital status, or any material facts which would induce sexual intercourse without trying to get into any matrimonial expectations. This protects women while also severing the provision from the assumption that marriage is what makes consent for sexual intercourse legitimate. Furthermore, this makes the provision gender neutral, a gap highlighted by various scholars.
THE DEEPER QUESTION
After looking at Section 69 and the cases related to it, a question that India’s reform conversations conveniently sidestep is about what exactly does one believe about woman’s consent?
If the belief is that women are autonomous beings who can make decisions about sexual intercourse on their own terms and have their own reasons, then the law should protect them from deception that undermines their decisions regardless of the existence of marriage. Whereas, if the belief is that sexual intercourse requires the legitimizing framework of marriage and a woman’s consent is only legible if based on a promise of marriage then Section 69 is the logical solution.
The kundali mismatch case hence comes off as an unexpected turn. A man citing horoscope incompatibility as a reason to end the relationship after years of assurance of marriage is a matter to be scrutinized. But the reason for scrutiny is because the consent framework under Section 69 requires it to do so and because it treats marriage as the basis of her consent in the first place. This understanding of consent is regressive and not a protective one, rather furthering the exploitation women could face. And, in 2026, this needs restructuring and reform.
Author(s) Name: Vrinda Nair (BITS Law School, Mumbai)
References:
[1] Ritu, ‘Subsequent refusal to marry due to Kundali mismatch despite prior assurances, raises doubts; Delhi HC denies bail in false promise of marriage case’ (SCC Online, 23 February 2026) <https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2026/02/23/delhi-high-court-denies-bail-false-promise-marriage/> accessed 08 June 2026
[2] Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, s 69
[3] Salil Tiwari, ‘‘No Criminality in Prolonged Relationships’: SC Flags Misuse of Laws in Sourced Consensual Cases” (Law Beat, 02 December 2024) <https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/amp/supreme-court-flags-misuse-law-soured-relationships> accessed 08 June 2026
[4] Kriti Malik, ‘False Promise to Marry’ (Live Law, 22 May 2026) <https://www.livelaw.in/lawschool/articles/false-promise-section69-535247> accessed 08 June 2026
[5] Khadija Khan, ‘Backtracking over ‘kundali’ mismatch after sex on promise of marriage is an offence— Delhi HC’ (The Print, 24 February 2026) <https://theprint.in/judiciary/backtracking-over-kundali-mismatch-after-sex-on-promise-of-marriage-is-an-offence-delhi-hc/2862432/> accessed 08 June 2026