The Investigator Who Judges: Structural Bias, Constitutional Fairness, and the Case for a New Test in Indian Administrative Law

Indian administrative law permits a structurally irregular practice: the concurrent execution of investigative and adjudicative roles by a single officer. This paper contends that this institutional design constitutes not merely a procedural anomaly but a constitutional deficiency, especially in the aftermath of Maneka Gandhi v Union of India. This paper critically analyses the four judicial propositions that support the practice of the Transfer Pricing Officer under Section 92CA of the Income Tax Act, 1961. These propositions include the rejection of the automatic presumption of bias, the presumption of integrity, statutory empowerment, and appellate cure. It argues that each proposition is constitutionally underinclusive within the post-Maneka Gandhi framework. The Parthasarathi test only looks at personal bias and not structural unfairness. The Withrow v Larkin principle was brought over without the necessary procedural protections. Under Articles 14 and 21, the Constitution says that all procedures must be fair, just, and not arbitrary. Statutory authorisation cannot change this. Finally, appellate review cannot fix a procedure that was structurally flawed in the past. This paper suggests that Parthasarathi should be supplemented by a structural fairness test that assesses institutional design independently of the actions of individual officers.